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This is  the  full  text of  Schuman's May  9,  1950, declaration,  with  the  exception of the  last  three  paragraphs  which  dealt 
with administrative details.  For a behind-the-scenes account of events leading up to  the  Declaration,  see  story on page  4. 
Ministers of the Six after the signing  of the European Coal and  S~eel Community Treaty in Paris on April 18,  1951. Left to right: Paul 
van  Zeeland (Belgium),  Joseph  Bech  (Luxembourg),  Joseph  Meurice  (Belgium),  Carlo  Sforza  (Italy),  Robert  Schuman  (France),  Konrad 
Adenauer (Germany),  Dirk Stikker and Jan  van den  Brink (the Netherlands). 
World  peace  cannot  be  safeguarded  without  the  making  of 
constructive  efforts  proportionate  to  the  dangers  which 
threaten  it. 
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can 
bring  to  civilization  is  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of 
peaceful  relations.  In  taking  upon  herself  for  more  than 
twenty years the role of champion of a united Europe, France 
1  has  always  had  as  her essential  aim  the  service  of peace.  A 
united  Europe  was  not  achieved,  and  we  had  war. 
Europe  will  not  be  made  all  at  once,  or  according  to  a 
single general plan. It will  be  built through concrete achieve-
ments,  which first  create a  de  facto  solidarity.  The gathering 
of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the  age-
old  opposition  of  France  and  Germany.  The  first  concern 
in  any  action undertaken  must  be  these  two  countries. 
With  this  aim  in  view,  the  French  Government  proposes 
to take action immediately on one limited but decisive  point. 
The  French  Government  proposes  to  place  Franco-German 
production of coal and steel under a common High Authority, 
within the  framework of an organization open to  the partici-
pation of the other countries of Europe. 
Common  Bases  for  Economic  Development 
The  pooling  of  coal  and  steel  production  will  immediately 
provide  for  the  setting-up  of  common  bases  for  economic 
development as  a  first  step  in  the  federation  of Europe,  and 
will  change  the  destinies  of  those  regions  which  have  long 
been  devoted  to  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war,  of 
which they  have been the  most constant victims. 
The solidarity  in  production  thus  established  will  make  it 
•  plain that  any  war  between  France  and  Germany  becomes, 
not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting-
up  of  this  powerful  production  unit,  open  to  all  countries 
willing  to  take  part,  and  eventually  capable  of providing  all 
the  member countries  with  the  basic  elements  of industrial 
production on the  same  terms,  will  lay  the  real  foundations 
for  their  economic  unification. 
This  production  will  be  offered  to  the  world  as  a  whole 
without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing 
to the raising of living standards and the promotion of peaceful 
achievements.  Europe,  with  new  means  at  her disposal,  will 
be  able to pursue the realization of one of her essential tasks, 
the  development  of the  African continent. 
European  Federation's  First  Concrete  Foundations 
In  this  way  there  will  be  realized,  simply  and  speedily,  that 
fusion of interests which is  indispensable to  the establishment 
of a  common economic system;  and  that will  be  the  leaven 
from which may grow a wider and deeper community between 
countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions. 
By  pooling basic production and by  setting up a new High 
Authority,  whose  decisions  will  be  binding  on  France,  Ger-
many,  and other member countries, these proposals will  build 
the first concrete foundation of the European federation which 
is  indispensable  to  the  preservation  of  peace. 
In order to  promote the  realization of the  objectives it has 
thus defined, the French Government is  ready to  open negotia-
tions  on the following  basis: 
The task  with which this  common High Authority will  be 
charged will  be  that of securing in  the  shortest possible  time 
the  modernization of production and  the  improvement of its 
quality; the supply of coal and steel  on identical terms to the 
French  and  German  markets,  as  well  as  to  the  markets  of 
other  member  countries;  the  development  in  common  of 
exports  to  other  countries;  and  the  equalization  as  well  as 
improvement of the living conditions of the workers  in  these 
industries. 
Fusion  of  the  Markets 
To achieve  these  objectives,  starting  from  the  very  disparate 
conditions in  which the productions of the  member countries 
are at present situated, certain transitional measures will  have 
to  be  instituted,  such  as  a  production  and  investment  plan, 
compensating machinery for  equating prices,  and an  amorti-
zation fund to facilitate the rationalization of production. The 
movement  of coal  and  steel  between  member  countries  will 
immediately  be  freed  of  all  customs  duties;  it  will  not  be 
permissible to apply differential transport rates to them. Condi-
tions will gradually be created which will spontaneously ensure 
the  most  rational  distribution  of  production  at  the  highest 
level  of productivity. 
In contrast  to  international  cartels,  which  aim  at dividing 
up and exploiting the national markets by means of restrictive 
practices  and  the  maintenance  of  high  profits,  the  proposed 
organization  will  ensure  the  fusion  of  the  markets  and  the 
expansion  of production.  .  .  .  3 4 
May9,1950 
A BEHIND-THE-SCENE ACCOUNT OF WHAT  HAPPENED 
FRAN<,;OIS  FONTAINE 
Mr.  Fontaine  is  head  of  the  European  Communities'  press  and 
information  office  in  Paris.  At the  time  the  Schuman  Plan  was 
taking shape,  Ire  was chef de cabinet to Jean  Monnet. Mr. Fontaine 
tells,  for  the  first  time,  the  inside  story  of political  circumstances 
and events in  France  leading  up  to  the Schuman  Plan  Declaration 
20 years ago. 
NEVER  HAD  CONDITIONS  IN  EUROPE  looked  more  confused, 
never had the Continent been nearer the explosion point than 
it  was  on the morning of May 9,  1950,  despite  the  constant 
efforts  of  dedicated  men  who  had  been  appealing  for  unity 
since the end of the last  war.  The morning newspapers were 
full of speculation about how the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs,  Robert  Schuman,  would  respond  to  his  British  and 
American colleagues,  Ernest .Bevin  and  Dean  Acheson,  who 
awaited him  the next day  in  London for important decisions 
about  West  Germany. 
France  was  almost  resigned  to  the  removal  of  the  last 
vestige  of  tripartite  occupation  control.  Allied  control  over 
the  Ruhr could no  longer  be  justified,  nor could  the  ceiling 
placed  on  coal  and  steel  production  in  a  country  that  was 
recovering rapidly. The problem of Germany's entry into the 
Western  defense  system  was  uppermost.  How  would  the 
Russians  respond  to  the  relaxation  of  Allied  control?  The 
French  Government  was  ready  to  propose  a  High  Atlantic 
Council,  the  "Bidault Plan,"  in  which  Germany would  have 
no  role.  The more  the  obsession  with  the  German  presence 
grew,  the  harder  everyone  tried  to  ignore  it. 
However, the head of this reconstituted state, an exceptional 
man, saw the dual danger of power and isolation.  Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer himself proposed limits on the sovereignty 
that  would  be  restored  to  Germany.  In  an  interview  two 
months earlier, he had spoken of a full  union between France 
and Germany, a union open to other countries. But he spoke 
for a defeated nation that had no voice in  international coun-
cils.  The news  took  up  only  a  few  lines  in  the  newspapers. 
However,  General Charles  de  Gaulle  echoed  his  words:  "If 
we  didn't force ourselves to look at the facts coolly, we would 
be  almost  blinded  by  the  prospects of what the  French and 
the Germans could accomplish together. ...  " But France had 
to  make  that effort.  Everyone knew  that no  initiative  could 
come from the vanquished. 
As for the conquerors, they were embarrassed by their re-
sponsibilities.  France had to  take  the first  step,  according to 
the  mandate  given  to  her  by  her  Allies.  Bernard  Clappier, 
Schuman's chef de  cabinet  at  that  time,  tells  that,  during  a 
meeting  of  the  three  Western  Powers  in  the  United  States 
at  the  end of 1949,  Acheson  stated:  "We  are  absolutely  in 
agreement  on entrusting our French colleague  with  the  task 
of defining our common policy  toward Germany." That was 
the  day  Schuman  understood  that he  would  not  escape  his 
destiny of erasing the frontier whose absurdity he more than 
any one else had known.' 
Schuman would seek a solution. Though he spoke the same 
language as  the Chancellor and shared the  same  high  ideals, 
he  could  not  easily  cast  aside  the  rights  of  the  conqueror. 
Particularly on the problem of the Saar, the French nationa-
lists were watching him. Little by little he came to believe that 
he would have  to  make a  radical  departure to  get  anywhere. 
Jean  Monnet  Steps  In 
Another Frenchman  had  also  reached  that  conclusion.  Jean 
Monnet, creator of France's post-war modernization plan, had 
watched  the  rapid  transformation  of  the  world  balance  of 
power,  the heating up of the cold war,  the  swift  recovery of 
Germany, the American decision to use this  recovery for the 
benefit of the West,  and the French reluctance  to  oppose it. 
To Monnet, Europe seemed to be  reviving every past error. 
He was  in  a  better position  than anyone else  to  gauge  the 
economic  consequences  of  this  disequilibrium.  He  saw  a 
return  to  national  rivalries  that would  lead  to  protectionism 
and  international  cartels:  France  would  crawl  into  a  shell; 
and,  in  the  face  of  Europe's  silence,  the  United  States  by 
itself would organize Western defenses against the ussR. Thus, 
his  fears  were  not  limited  to  economic  activity.  He  did  not 
think only in  terms of organizing production-related  areas  as 
did many of the European pioneers who sought international 
control over the French and German coal and steel economies. 
Like  Schuman,  he  wanted  to  change  Germany's  image  in 
Europe's consciousness  once  and  for  all.  Like  Adenauer,  he 
thought the  time had come to  help fix  the  destiny  of an  un-
stable  people  who  shifted  dangerously  between  feelings  of 
national superiority and inferiority. 
The  paroxysm  of  anxiety  reached  in  the  spring  of  1950 
and the convergence of the thoughts of two  men  who  barely 
knew  each  other  would  later  seem  extraordinary.  Schuman 
had  had  little  contact  with  Monnet.  Moreover,  Monnet  did 
not approach the Minister for Foreign Affairs when he decided 
to  act.  Instead,  he  sent  Premier  Georges  Bidault  a  letter 
proposing  "concrete  and  resolute  action,  in  a  limited  but 
decisive  area."  There was  to  be  a  "basic  change"  in  French 
relations with Germany "by creating a common base for eco-
nomic  conditions  and  new  European  rules  and  institutions 
accepted  by  the  sovereign  nations." '  It was  to  be  the  Coal 
and Steel  Community, with Europe's first  supranational  insti-
tutions.  But Bidault did not consider this  proposal  important. 
Monnet became impatient as the clouds gathered over Europe. 
On Friday, April 28, he saw Clappier and gave him the same 
message  for  Schuman.  That  very  night,  Schuman  thought 
about this  message  in  the solitude of Scy-Chazelles.' Monday 
morning,  getting  off  the  train  at the  Gare  de  I'Est,  he  said 
to  his  colleague:  "The answer is  yes.  I  will  take care of it." 
Events would unfold swiftly. 
The  "Conspiracy" 
It  is  Monday,  May  1.  Before  the  London  conference  on 
May 10, a revolutionary economic and political proposal must 
be  put  into  shape,  adopted,  and  published  by  the  French 
Government, and Europe's answer received-with all prepara-
tions in absolute secrecy. 
Quite  rightly  the  Schuman  Plan  has  been  called  a  con-
spiracy.  Had  it  been  publicly  debated,  conservative  forces 
would have torn it to pieces. The diplomats would have "nego-
tiated."  There  had  been  more  than  enough  talk.  Another 
criticism  rested  on  a  more solid  base:  that fusing  two  huge 
systems  of  production,  eliminating  econo~ic  frontiers  and 
ancient protectionist practices, would need months of consul-
tations  and  technical  study.  However,  the  case  had  to  be settled in  a week, without experts. On this  point, Monnet and 
Schuman had the same ideas  and the  same clear conscience: 
experts would come later. It  was an essentially political proposal. 
For fear of arousing suspicion, Monnet and Schuman com-
municate  through  an  intermediary,  Clappier.  Monnet closets 
himself  with  two  aides,  Etienne  Hirsch  and  Pierre  Uri. 
They are  joined by  legal  expert Paul  Reuter,  inventor of the 
High Authority 
3  and the  originator of Europe's first  federal 
institutions.  Each night the day's notes  are burned.  Only two 
ministers know about the work: Rene Mayer and Rene Pleven. 
The  Plan  Proposed 
The morning of May 9  the  text of the declaration is  taken to 
Schuman  as  he  enters  the  Council  of  Ministers  meeting.  It 
was  said  that instead  of reading the  text to  his  colleagues  he 
"recounted" it,  which  is  in  keeping with  the style of this  man 
who could seem  sincere  while  being  deliberately  vague  when 
interests  of  state  required  it.  Meanwhile,  in  Bonn  a  hand-
written  letter  was  being  put  into  the  Chancellor's  hands. 
Adenauer,  surprised  and  moved,  immediately  answered:  "I 
approve wholeheartedly." 
In Paris, the Council meeting dragged on, but it had already 
turned  to  other  topics.  Schuman  had  immediately  received 
the Council's carte blanche  for  the London conference, with-
out  revealing  his  intentions  of telling  the  public of his  plan 
that very night in Paris. 
In  a  few  hours  a  vast  operation  had  been  readied.  The 
press  corps was  asked  to  come  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  at  four 
that afternoon  for  a  message  of prime  importance.  The  am-
bassadors  were  to  meet  with  the  Minister  one  hour  earlier. 
Those  present  that  afternoon  recall  the  constant  stream  of 
visitors to Schuman's office.  On leaving, each was intercepted 
by Monnet who told them:  "You know it  is  not a  joke.  Read 
the  paper carefully. It is  going  to  happen. Believe  me,  there 
is no other way out."  · 
At the last moment, Schuman wrote  by  hand the beautiful 
preamble:  "It is  no  longer  a  question  of  empty  words,  but 
rather of a bold act,  a constructive act. France has acted  and 
the results of her actions can be immense. We hope they will be." 
Only a few  men could gauge the  meaning of these  phrases. 
"No  more  empty  words ....  "  Yes,  thought  the  intrigued 
listeners, that's what they always say, but we'll  still  be  talking 
about it,  in  vain,  for a long time to come. "A  bold  act .. .  ," 
that's a  fancy  phrase  for just  another proposal  for  the Ruhr 
L  problem.  "France  has  acted  . ..  ,"  perhaps,  but  whether  or 
\  not  the  other  nations  follow  her  remains  to  be  seen.  There 
was  some  scepticism  in  the  Salon  de  I'Horloge  as  Schuman 
read  the  declaration  in  his  monotonous  soft  voice.  "Europe 
will  not be made all  at once, or according to  a single,  general 
plan.  It will  be  built  through  concrete  achievements,  which 
first create de facto solidarity ....  " 
Those  words  contained  the  terms  of an  empirical  method 
meant  to  reassure  and  even  mislead  certain  people.  The 
prospect  of  pooling  coal  and  steel  resources  disturbed  only 
the  steelmen  who  declared  war at  that  very  second.  But  for 
the public, the plan conformed closely to  ideas of the moment. 
A  note  drafted  at  the  last  minute  by  Pierre  Uri  was  simul-
taneously distributed to journalists emphasizing  that the High 
Authority  would  be  completely  different  from  a  cartel.  This 
could  only  be  to  the  good  for  the  French,  haunted  by  the 
reemergence of the German steel cartels. 
The  Key  Words:  European  Federation 
To convince political commentators to  treat the plan in  a way 
that would capture the public imagination at that time of dis-
enchantment,  it  had  to  be  played  up.  A  note  from  Agence 
France  Presse  stressed  the  importance  of the  event.  "It is  a 
political  gesture  of exceptional  importance-some  people  go 
so far as to call it 'revolutionary'." 
The transformation of economic sectors  that had  provided 
the  means  for  two  wars  into  an  instrument  of  peace  was 
emphasized.  However,  most  people  scarcely  saw  beyond  the 
settlement of the  Franco-German  dispute.  "Europe"  was  not 
yet clearly seen. Nonetheless, the key words had been uttered, 
the  words  that have given  validity  to  every  political  develop-
ment in  the Community for the past twenty years:  "This pro-
posal will  huild the first  concrete foundation  of the  European 
Federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace." 
In  1950, the  word  "peace" was  stronger and  better under-
stood  than  the  expression  "European  Federation.''  It  was  a 
chance  for  peace  that  the  French  and  all  Europe  welcomed 
that night. 
The news  dispatches announced the  agreement of the Ger-
man, Italian, Belgian,  Luxembourg, and  Dutch Governments. 
In retrospect, the feeling remains that this was a well-mounted 
operation.  Now it  seems  astonishing  that  the  Community  of 
Six,  which  has  stood  the  test  of time,  simply  fell  into  place 
in  a  matter  of  hours,  without  any  lengthy  deliberations  by 
kings,  queens,  and  presidents;  but this  is  what  actually  hap-
pened.  Sovereignty,  like  privilege,  either  abdicates  in  an 
instant of generosity or not at all. 
After all,  no one had yet spoken of the  Six  when Schuman 
concluded:  "Gentlemen,  France  is  making  a  proposal,  with 
no  idea  of  how  it  will  turn  out.  It  is  up  to  Europe  to 
answer. ...  " 
"Is Russia a part of Europe?" someone  immediately asked. 
"Of course . . .  " 
"Then it's a leap into the unknown?" 
"That's  right,  a  leap  into  the  unknown,"  said  the  French 
Minister. "I thank you, gentlemen." 
In a  little  while  he  would  leave  for  London  to  meet with 
Bevin  and  Acheson.  Perhaps the  English  read  the  text  more 
carefully or understood  the  meaning of the  French  proposal 
less  fully,  for the British declined membership  (see  page  6) . 
In  any  case,  the  London  conference  took  place,  but  the 
original  agenda  was  thrown  out.  May  1  0  dawned  over  a 
healing  Corttinent  once  again  imbued  with  hope. 
1. The son  of a farmer from  the  Lorraine, Schuman  was  born  in 
Luxembourg and  later made his  home  in  Metz,  in  Lorraine,  which 
was annexed to Germany in  1871, but returned to  France after the 
First  World  War. 
2.  This  introductory note  (nine  pages  long  in  the  final  version  of 
May  4.  1950), a secret historical document, was  published  for  the 
first time by  Le Monde, on  May  9,  1970. 
3. Schuman's  home  near  Metz,  France. 
4.  The  nine-man  Executive  of the  Coal  and  Steel  Community.  5 6 
Britain and the Schuman Declaration 
ROGER  MASSIP 
MAY 10, 1950, THE DAY  AFTER ROBERT SCHUMAN'S declaration, 
he  met in  London with his  American and  British  colleagues, 
Dean  Acheson  and  Ernest  Bevin.  The  conference,  arranged 
several weeks before, was to re-examine the German problem. 
(It was  after this  meeting that the three  powers  published  a 
declaration  expressing  the  Allies'  intentions  of  pursuing  a 
policy enabling Germany to be  progressively reintegrated into 
the  community  of  the  free  peoples  of  Europe.)  While  the 
ministerial  discussions  were  going  on,  Robert Schuman  and 
Jean Monnet, who joined the Minister on  May  14,  held  talks 
with the head of the British Foreign Office  and his colleagues. 
They  provided  details  and  explanations  of  the  French  plan 
and tried to convince the British of their sincere desire  to  see 
the United Kingdom involved in it. 
However,  they  met  with  a  rather  cool  reception.  There 
were other conversations, as  well  as  an exchange of notes and 
messages which began on May 25  and  went on until  June  3. 
The result is  well  known:  Britain  refused  to  take  the  plunge, 
and the negotiations for the treaty setting up the first European 
Community took place with only the governments of France, 
Germany, Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  and Luxembourg. 
The reactions both of the British public  and  of the  British 
Government help to explain why Whitehall was  led  to  refuse 
the proposal made to it. 
The  First  Step  Towards  the  European  Federation 
The first  comments by the press in Britain tended  to  approve 
of the  Schuman  Plan.  Most  big  London  newspapers  looked 
upon  the  French  plan  as  a  serious,  praiseworthy  effort  to 
bring Germany into the community of European nations and 
end Franco-German enmity. The papers also  recognized  that 
the Schuman Plan could offer economic advantages for Great 
Britain,  but they  were not yet aware  that the authors of the 
Plan  envisaged  the  coal  and  steel  pool  as  simply  the  first 
step towards a European federal union. 
This  federalist  interpretation  of  the  Schuman  Plan  was 
not  endorsed  by  the  British  Government.  Right  from  the 
initial  contacts  and  throughout  Monnet's  explanations,  the 
Whitehall officials  knew what the  issue  was.  It was  perfectly 
clear to them that the French Government had definite  views 
on the ramifications of its plan, as well as on the way in which 
negotiations should be conducted. Ernest Bevin was, without a 
doubt,  the  first  British  statesmen  to  gauge  the  true  scope  of 
the French proposal and to grasp that it was intended to intro-
duce a new factor into the problem of  Europ~'s development 
towards unity. 
On  May  25,  Whitehall's  first  message  to  Paris  stated  its 
strong  interest  in  the  French  plan;  and  on  May  27,  in  a 
memorandum, the British Government asserted its willingness 
to  take part in  all  future discussions.  However,  its  third mes-
sage,  on May  31,  was  more  cautiously  phrased.  The  British 
Government said it would take part in  the talks  proposed by 
France in  the  hopes  they  would  result  in  a  plan  that Great 
Britain  could  support.  There  had  therefore  been  a  change 
of heart.  Great Britain had thought,  initially,  that she  could 
join a  Coal and Steel  Community.  Now she  only  wanted  to 
Mr.  Massip,  Foreign  Editor of the  French  newspaper  Le  Figaro, 
was present when Schuman read his declaration. 
take  part in  the  proposed conference but believed  she  could 
not  accept  France's  conditions  for  participation  in  the  dis-
cussions.  On this  point,  the  British  memorandum of June  2 
is  clear.  Britain  did  not  consider  the  new  wording  of  the 
communique  proposed  in  the  latest  communication  sent  to 
London  any  more  satisfactory  than  the  previous  forms.  If 
Her  Majesty's  Government  were  to  accept  this,  read  the 
memorandum, it would consider itself bound to place its  coal 
and  steel  production  in  a  European  pool,  and  to  set  up  a 
new  High  Authority  which  would  make  decisions  binding 
upon  the  government  concerned.  The  memorandum  further 
stated that, although not flatly  rejecting such  possibilities,  the 
British Government could not grant its consent without being 
fully  informed of the  plan's political  and  economic  implica-
tions. 
The  Two  Key  Principles 
The  French  position  was  very  different.  Paris  called  for 
acceptance  of  the  two  principles  laid  down  in  the  May  9 
declaration: the pooling of European coal and steel production 
and the creation of a High Authority to  make decisions bind-
ing  upon  the  participating  countries.  Discussions  could,  of 
course, be held about how these principles were to be carried 
out,  but  the  countries  had  to  accept  them  in  advance  and 
agree  never  to  call  them  into  question.  This  was  what  the 
British Government refused to do. 
The question has been raised as  to why the French Govern-
ment  did  not offer  some  compromise,  such  as  agreeing  that 
Great  Britain  should  sign  a  special  communique  in  which 
she  would  be  able  to  withhold  acceptance  until  the  details 
of  the  plan  were  definite.  This  suggestion  was  made  from 
various  sides,  but the  French Government scotched  it  in  its 
note of May 30, which firmly  stated that negotiations had to 
be  clearly directed  by  agreement on the  basic  aims.  In other 
words,  France  refused  to  grant Great Britain  the  privileged 
position that Whitehall wanted at the start. The French had a 
communique to be signed:  the British could take it or leave it. 
Such was the situation on June 2,  when it was  decided that 
the  discussions  would  be  terminated  by  three  communiques. 
These were:  a communique from the "Six" accepting the basic 
principles;  one  from  Great  Britain,  reaffirming  her point of 
view and recording the difference between French and British 
opinion, and one from France, promising to  keep the British 
informed and to bear Whitehall's point of view in mind during 
the Paris conference. 
British  Reservations 
. The reasons  for France's intransigence are  obvious. It would 
have  been  illogical  and  probably  dangerous  to  admit  to  the 
conference  table  as  voting  member a  state which  manifestly 
wished to remain aloof from the European project by  refusing 
to  accept the  obligations  required  of it.  The  same  objection 
held true for the participation of observers hostile to the plan 
on principle, since they might be tempted to  throw a  wrench 
into the works, paralyzing the negotiations. 
This  firm  opposition  to  any  British  intrusion  as  long  as 
London refused to take part unreservedly showed that, as  far 
as  the  "Six"  were  concerned,  the  objective  was  quite  clear: not merely to create a coal and steel pool but to  lay the foun-
dations for European unification. 
This is  the crux of the  problem  raised  by  relationships be-
tween Great Britain and Europe in  1950. The British Govern-
ment was fully aware of the real purpose of the Schuman Plan 
and,  for  this  reason,  wanted  to  stay  out.  Both  Conservatives 
and Labour agreed on this  point.  Neither party was  prepared 
to  take the path to a European federation.  Winston Churchill 
bluntly  declared  that he could not envisage  Great  Britain  as 
an ordinary  member of a  federation  limited  to  Europe. This 
opinion  of  the  old  Conservative  leader,  who  was  a  leading 
figure in the European Movement and who, in a great speech 
at the University of Zurich, had called for the establishment of 
a  United States of Europe, is  only disconcerting at first  sight. 
Winston Churchill championed European unity,  but he  never 
contemplated its  including Great Britain, except via an associ-
ation which would leave her a free hand, especially on the side 
of the "open sea."  Two years  later, Anthony Eden expressed 
the same dislike of federation. In a speech given in the United 
States  on  January  II,  1952,  after  the  Conservatives'  return 
to  power,  he  declared  that Great Britain and its  interests ex-
tended  far  beyond  the  European  Continent,  to  beyond  the 
oceans. 
British  Feared  European  Involvement 
In 1950, then, there was total support for the Labour Govern-
ment's  refusal  to  participate  in  the French plan.  There  wer~ 
various,  deep-seated reasons for this  distrustful  reaction,  this 
distaste  for European involvement.  They were based on eco-
nomic,  political,  and  psychological  considerations.  The  final 
determining factors, however, were political and psychological. 
Convincing proof of this is given by  The Times' lead article on 
July 29,  1950, on the Schuman Plan. According to  this British 
paper,  the  plan  would  have  been  more  successful  had  the 
French not wished to  make the coal  and  steel  organization  a 
vehicle for European political  federation.  This French desire, 
so  The  Times  said,  hindered  an  economic  analysis  of  the 
proposals  a9-d  of  the  industrial  and  commercial  difficulties 
which they were designed to deal with. This comment clearly 
shows  that  Britain's  real  reasons  for  refusing  were  political. 
In  1950,  a  European federation  involved  two  dangers  for 
Great Britain.  First of all,  it  would exclude the United States 
which,  as  the  federation  developed  into  a  formidable  power, 
might consider this  a  pretext for  ending or reducing  its  par-
ticipation in European defense. On the other hand, a federated 
Europe  might  be  tempted  to  do  without  America.  Great 
Britain  did  not want to  risk  either American  isolationism  or 
European neutrality. 
The second  danger  was  this:  membership  in  a  European 
federation would  deprive Britain of her freedom  of action  in 
relations  with  the  United  States,  thus  making  it  impossible 
for  Britain  to  maintain  her position  as  America's  privileged 
partner. 
In  1950,  just  as  later,  Great  Britain's  relations  with  the 
Commonwealth formed an obstacle to any European commit-
ment,  though  in  this  case  it  was  primarily  an  economic 
obstacle.  However,  even  in  the  political  sphere,  there  were 
still  plenty of arguments to  remind people of the existence of 
this  organization based on allegiance to the British Crown, as 
well as  of the difficulties that would be bound to arise if Great 
Britain had dual responsibilities. The United Kingdom wanted 
to preserve these  Commonwealth links,  which  were  as  much 
sentimental as  political. Britain, therefore,  refused both to cut. 
herself  off  from  the  Commonwealth  by  disappearing  into 
Europe  and  to  get  any  closer  to  it  than  to  its  former  do-
minions. Here again, Great Britain's main concern was  clear: 
to retain her freedom of action in world affairs. 
There is  still  another reason resulting  from  what could be 
called "political psychology." The citizen of the United King-
dom will not easily agree to  a close association of his country 
with  foreign  states in  a community governed by  an authority 
more  powerful  than the Parliament of Westminster.  Feelings 
of superiority  doubtless  explain  part  of  this  reluctance,  but 
(and this was particularly true in  1950)  it was also loyalty to 
a national ideal which the Second World War had in  no way 
shaken.  Great Britain  had  emerged  from  the  struggle  sorely 
tried,  but victorious  and  confident  of the enduring nature of 
its  position as  a great world  power. The Briton  of the  1950's 
did  not share  the Continental European's acute awareness  of 
being a dwarf between the American and Soviet giants. Unlike 
his  French counterpart, he  felt  no  need  for union with other 
nations to  compensate for the  relative  weakness of a country 
reduced  to  its  own  resources.  He remained  basically  insular, 
and  although  he  might  understand  France's  gradual  con-
version  to  the  virtues  of  a  European  federation,  he  did  not 
think his  country's case comparable to the position of nations 
that had suffered  military defeat and  been  occupied  for four 
years.  These were,  by  and large,  the  feelings  which  inspired 
the  British  leaders'  reactions.  Twenty  years  ago,  Britain  was 
not ready for commitment to Europe. 
Conversion  to  the  European  Idea 
Events brought about a drastic change in  this attitude, and the 
British,  basically  pragmatic  people,  quickly  learned  their 
"lsolationists!"-Cummings in  the British newspaper Daily Express 
on  June  10,  1950,  depicted  Harry  Truman  and  Dean  Acheson 
pointing  accusingly  at  Clement Attlee,  Hugh  Dalton,  and  Ernest 
Bevin after Britain  declined  to  join  the  European  Coal  and Steel 
Community. 8 
In  1950,  Robert  Schuman  (right)  and  Jean  Monnet  drew  the 
conclusions  forced  on  them  after  long,  fruitless  efforts:  "Britain 
is  not yet ready  to  take  the step  we  wanted to  take  with  her.  We 
must wait ....  " 
lesson. "The British believe only in facts:  create the European 
fact and they will believe it," prophesied Jean Monnet in 1950. 
This respect  for  the  realities  of life  led  Britain  to  take  a 
close  interest  in  the  work  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community,  to  send  a  mission  to  the  High  Authority  in 
Luxembourg, and finally  to become an associate  in  the  Com-
munity.  This  initial,  timid  but  extremely  revealing,  gesture 
marked the  beginning of a  new  development:  on  August  9, 
1961,  the  Macmillan  government  asked  the  Six  for  negotia-
tions for membership in  the Common Market (as well  as  the 
Ecsc and Euratom). Whitehall had thus drawn its conclusions 
from the success of the European Community. 
The British  were  also  converted  to  the  European  idea  be-
cause  in  1950 they had rejected  the  disintegration of British 
power.  Harold Macmillan was the first  politician to grasp the 
new  choice  imposed  on  Britain  by  its  new  situation  as  a 
middle-sized power,  unable to pursue a world-wide  policy  on 
its  own. The illusions of the years  after the costly victory of 
1945  had vanished.  The  United  States  was  proving  increas-
ingly  less  inclined to maintain the "special relationship"  with 
Great Britain.  At the  beginning  of  1961,  John  F.  Kennedy 
had made it clear to Whitehall that the dialogue between the 
United States and Britain could continue effectively  only  via 
Europe.  The  inescapable  choice  was  therefore  between  be-
coming  a  satellite  of the  United  States  and  assuming  a  role 
worthy of the great past within a group of nations resolved to 
unite  their weakened  forces  to  regain,  as  a  body,  the  power 
each of them had lost individually. 
Harold  Wilson  was  convinced  by  the  same  evidence.  In 
1967,  this  man,  who  in  1961  had  vehemently  attacked  his 
country's application to  join  the  Common Market, asked  for 
the European Community's gates  to be  opened to  the United 
Kingdom. Just as  there had been unanimity in  1950 in reject-
ing  the  Schuman  Plan,  so  too,  from  1967  on,  there  was 
unanimity on an application that was  no  longer partisan but 
national. 
The scene confronting Wilson today is  almost as  gloomy as 
the  one  Mr.  Macmillan  mournfully  regarded  in  1961.  The 
old  empire  is  no  more  than  a  memory.  The  myth  of  the 
Commonwealth  as  a  source  of  power  and  influence  is  no 
longer  accepted  by  responsible  people.  Great  Britain  could, 
no  doubt,  associate  more closely  with the  United States  and 
Canada within the framework of an Atlantic free  trade area; 
but the difference  in  scale  between the  United Kingdom and 
America is too great, as is  also the United States' technological 
lead.  In reality,  association would mean absorption.  Only the 
European  option  remains.  Here  the  scale  is  the  same.  Geo·· 
graphical  proximity  reinforces  a  genuine  community  of 
interests.  Great Britain's technological  lead  would  enable  her 
to  make a  considerable contribution.  The British  have  really 
gone empirically  into the  problem of  relations  between  their 
country and Europe. Today they are convinced, and there can 
be  no  doubt whatever  about  the sincerity  of  their  desire  to 
work with the "Six" to build a stronger and more independent 
Europe. 
In  1950  Robert  Schuman and  Jean  Monnet,  in  the  very 
terms  General  de  Gaulle  would  use  in  1963,  drew the  con-
clusions  forced  on them  after long,  fruitless  efforts:  "Britain 
is  not yet ready to take the step we wanted to take with her. 
We  must  wait. ...  "  Years  have  gone  by.  A  slow,  silent 
revolution  has  taken  place.  Every  month  confirms  it,  and 
strengthens the  desire  of those  who today  wish  to  force  the 
gates of Europe just as  fervently  as  their predecessors twenty 
years ago wished to go in  the opposite direction. 
If, in 1945, Great Britain had taken the initiative of calling 
upon the countries of Europe to unite-not without her, 
but with her-her appeal would certainly have been heard, 
and she would have become the nerve center of a new 
Community. But, if one knows just a little history and a 
smattering of geography, it is easy enough to understand 
and to respect the motives that led her to choose a different 
attitude. For Great Britain was lucid enough to tell the 
democracies of Western Europe: "Unite." She was not 
ambitious enough to say: "Let us unite." The Community 
was thus built according to the wishes of Great Britain, that 
is to say without Great Britain. 
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE SCHUMANN 
Address before the Franco-British Society 
London, January 22, 1970 Entry Talks Can Begin 
JUNE 30 HAS  BEEN  SET as  the date for the opening session of 
negotiations  between  the  European Community and the four 
countries that have applied for membership:  the United King-
dom,  Ireland,  Denmark,  and  Norway.  This  session  will  take 
place in  Luxembourg. 
This target date was  agreed on by  the Council of Ministers 
meeting in Brussels on May 11-12. Final decision on the date, 
however,  still  depends on the progress between now and then 
on the Community's common negotiating position. At the May 
I l-12 meeting,  a  common position was  reached on problems 
connected  with  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
Treaty,  problems  related  to  the  British  Commonwealth,  and 
institutional problems. Meeting in  Luxembourg on April 20-21. 
the  Council  reached  agreement  on  its  common  position  on 
problems related to the European Coal and Steel Community, 
problems  connected with  economic  and monetary  union  and 
the  Community's further  development,  and  additional  points 
concerning the transitional period for the candidate countries, 
on which agreement had been reached in  March. 
Wine Policy Finally Set 
The last obstacle to the start of membership negotiations-final 
agreement on  the details of the regulation outlining a common 
Commission  Vice  President  Sicco  L. Mansholt (left),  architect  of 
the  Community's  farm  reform  program,  talks  with  Luxembourg 
Minister of Agriculture Jean-Pierre  Biichler (center)  and German 
Minister of Agriculture Joseph  Ertl during a break in the March 20 
Council  discussions  on  wine.  Since  the  Ministers  of  Agriculture 
could not reach a decision  at  that meeting or at later meetings, the 
foreign  ministers stepped  in  "to  apply  political  pressure,"  accord-
ing  to  Dutch Foreign  Minister Joseph  M. A. H.  Luns. 
wine policy-was cleared at the April 20-21  meeting, when the 
basic  regulation was  adopted. The executing regulations were 
acted on the following week at the April 27-28 Council meeting 
in Brussels. 
Various member countries had imposed a number of condi-
tions on the opening of entry talks. France insisted that the Six 
settle  the  final  rules  for  financing  the  common farm  policy, 
which  they  did  at a fifty-hour  marathon last  December, pro-
ducing  a  two-part  package  deal.  The  Community  would  be 
given the means of financing its activities from its own resources 
(levies  on  farm  imports,  customs duties,  and part of the rev-
enue  from  TV  A,  the  common turnover  tax),  while  the Euro-
pean Parliament's control over the Community's budget would 
be  increased  in  1975.  However,  the  two  decisions  and  the 
treaty providing the legal basis for the package were concluded 
only on April  21  and April  22,  respectively, because Italy re-
fused to sign the financial  agreement until the Six had finished 
the common policy for wine, which took longer than expected. 
After the Six had agreed upon the bases of a wine policy in 
February, wine growers in  Luxembourg and Germany insisted 
that they should be allowed  to continue adding sugar to their 
wines to compensate for their relative Jack of sunshine. In addi-
tion, France asked for higher price-support levels than her part-
ners had envisaged. 
After two months of inconclusive Council meetings, attended 
by  the  agricultural  ministers,  the  ministers  for foreign  affairs 
stepped  into  the  discussions,  "to apply political  pressure," as 
Dutch  Foreign  Minister  Joseph  Luns  put  it.  Following  two 
days  of virtually  nonstop  talks,  the  deadlock  was  broken on 
April 21.  As  a  result,  wine  will  circulate freely  from  June  1; 
Germany  and  Luxembourg  winegrowers  will  b(:  allowed  to 
increase the alcoholic strength of their wines by  up to 3-5  per 
cent by adding sugar, and  price-support levels will  be fixed  at 
current French rates, the highest in the Community. 
Confusion on Parliament's Powers 
At 1 a.m. on April 22, less than an hour after the wine compro-
mise had been approved, the Council signed a treaty amending 
the budgetary clauses of the Ecsc, Common Market, Euratom, 
and merger Treaties and increasing the Parliament's budgetary 
powers.  At  the  ceremony,  Belgian  Foreign  Minister  Pierre 
Harmel, who had presided over the Council session,  appealed 
to the six national parliaments tv ratify the treaty in time for it 
to come into force on January I, 1971, as scheduled. 
The  Six  also  agreed  to  reconsider  the  increased  powers 
granted to  the European Parliament, following complaints by 
the  Parliament that  its  post-1975  budgetary powers would be 
limited  to  a  small  fraction  of  the  total  community  budget. 
Within two years the Commission will propose changes. 
The Commission  welcomed  the  Council's  agreement on  a 
common wine policy, but thought that the ministers had given 
insufficient attention to the European Parliament's views on its 
increased'budgetary powers. The Commission also  dissociated 
itself from  the Council's final  decision  on this question. 
At issue  was whether or not the treaty allowed the Parlia-
ment to reject the Community budget, as  a whole, by a three-
fifths majority after 1975, and whether the Council would then 
have to make new proposals. Although the Council declined to 
interpret the text, it did agree to take another look at it by 1972.  9 10 
Europe Since 1945 
1945 
At the end of the Second World War, Western  Europe lay  in 
ruins. It faced two fundamental questions. One was economic: 
how  could  the  material  destruction  be  repaired?  The second 
was  political: how could Europe recover political strength and 
stability? 
1946 
A  response to the political question  was  heard in  1  946  when. 
in  Zurich,  Winston  Churchill  stressed  the  need  to  build  a 
"United States of Europe." 
1947 
The promise of economic recovery for  Europe came from  the 
United States with the Marshall  Plan proposal  in  1947.  The 
only condition attached to American aid was that Europe itself 
organize  the  recovery.  To  do  this,  European  nations  formed 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (  OEEC), 
and later the European Payments Union. 
1948 
At a  meeting  held  at The Hague  in  1948,  Europe's  political 
leaders advocated the establishment of a European Parliament 
as a step to the poltical union of Europe. Ten European coun-
tries  in  1949  agreed  to  form  the  Council of Europe.  Despite 
ambitious aims, the Council of Europe lacked an institutional 
structure with decision-making powers. It soon became merely 
a diplomatic sounding board for its members. 
1950 
On May 9,  1950, Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, 
read to representatives of the world press a proposal from  his 
Government, a proposal described by  Walter Lippman as  the 
most audacious and constructive since the war. This blueprint 
for the future integration of Europe, drafted by Jean Monnet 
only a few days earlier, became known as the "Schuman Plan." 
Its  aim  was  to  reconcile  France  and  Germany  within  a 
European Federation. Its  method was  to  create de  facto  eco-
nomic  solidarity  among  Europeans  by  pooling  basic  produc-
tion, beginning with a European authority for coal  and steel. 
1951 
On April 18,  1951, less than one year after Schuman's declara-
tion, six European countries-Belgium, France, Italy,  Luxem-
bourg,  and  the  Netherlands-signed  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel Community (Ecsc) Treaty in  Paris. 
1952 
The parliaments of the six countries ratified the Treaty and thus 
created the first European institutions with federal  characteris-
tics. The executive branch of the Ecsc was independent of gov-
ernments, and its  decisions  not subject to  veto.  It established 
a "common market" for coal and steel, administered Europe's 
first  effective  anti-trust  law,  carried  out  Europe's  first  labor 
resettlement  and  "trade  adjustment"  policy,  and  levied  the 
first  European (as opposed to national)  tax  on coal and steel 
production. 
1954 
After unsuccessful  attempts  to  establish  a  European  Political 
Community  and  a  European  Defense  Community  in  1954, 
Europeans turned back to  the  economic road to  integration. 
Europe's economic weakness contrasted vividly  with the eco-
nomic strength of the two continental giants, the United States 
and  the  ussR,  whose  political  policies  largely  dominated  the 
world. 
1955 
Next  step  toward  unification  was  taken  at  Messina,  in  June 
1955, when, under the chairmanship of Belgian Foreign Minis-
ter Paul Henri Spaak, a committee was  instructed by  the  six 
Community countries to examine the possibilities  for general 
The opening session.  on August 10,  1952, of the  High  Authority, 
the  executive  of the  European  Coal  and Steel  Community.  lean 
Monnet (right)  was  the  ECSC's  first  President.  Franz  Etzel (left), 
its first  Vice President. 
economic union and joint development of the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. 
1956 
As  a  result of the Spaak Committee  Report,  negotiations  for 
drafting two  treaties opened in Brussels. 
1957 
The Treaties were signed on March 25,  1957, in Rome, where 
the  ministers  of  the  six  countries  formally  established  the 
European  Economic  Community  (Common  Market)  and 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom). 
1958 
Provisionally located in Brussels, the Community"s institutions 
began their work, consisting of setting up a customs union and 
shaping common economic policies for the whole Community. 
1959 
On the first of January, the first cuts in  the custom duties for 
goods traded between the member countries were carried out. 
1960 
In 1960, the Six  took the first  steps  towards  bringing national 
tariffs on imports from non-member countries into line  with a 
common external tariff. 
1961 
In the course of 1961, steps were made to free the movement 
of men, firms,  and services throughout the six  member states. 
The Community also  moved  into  the  more  difficult  phase of 
working  out  common  policies,  especially  in  the  spheres  of 
agriculture, competition, transport, and trade with  the  rest  of 
the world. Hand in  hand with the internal development of the 
Community, external affairs loomed larger in its activities:  the 
first  association  agreement was  signed,  with  Greece;  applica-
tions for full membership in the Community were presented by 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. 1962 
President  Kennedy  proposed  the  Trade  Expansion  Program 
and an "Atlantic Partnership." 
1963 
Formal association links for aid and trade were forged with 18 
independent  African  countries  and  with  Turkey.  The  Com-
munity signed  its  first  trade agreement,  with  Iran.  A  sudden 
veto  by France in January  1963  ended  membership  negotia-
tions with Great Britain and precipitated the Community's first 
political crisis. 
1964 
On May 4th, negotiations opened in Geneva under the General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  aimed  at  cutting 
tariffs by  50 per cent on goods traded among the  GATT mem-
ber  countries.  The Six  adopted  the  first  Community plan  to 
combat inflation  and,  to  secure  growth  equilibrium,  drew up 
its  first  five-year  economic  program.  The  free  movement  of 
workers throughout the Community became effective with the 
abolition  of  the  priority  given  to  national  workers  on  the 
national employment markets. 
1965 
In the first  half of the year 1965, the customs union was well 
under  way,  agricultural  policy  was  making  progress,  the 
merger  of  EEC,  Euratom,  and  Ecsc  Community  Executives 
was decided, and other decisions were being taken in a number 
of fields.  At midnight on June 30,  1965, a second major crisis 
broke.  France sought to  modify  the  role of the  Commission 
and abandon majority voting on matters which a government 
considered vital to national interests.  The other five  members 
refused. Consequently, France boycotted the Council of Minis-
ters  and  other  Community  institution  meetings  for  seven 
months. 
1966 
On the 28th and 29th of January 1966, the  Foreign Ministers 
of  the  Six,  after  "agreeing  to  disagree"  on  disputed  issues 
raised  by  France,  decided  to  resume  normal  work  in  Com-
munity  institutions.  In  July,  the  six  agricultural  ministers 
adopted  the  basic  principles  and  fixed  common  prices  to  be 
applied  throughout  the  Community  for  majbr  agricultural 
products. 
1967 
On May 11,  1967,  Britain  renewed  its  application  for  Com-
munity membership. Four days later, The Kennedy Round-
wherein  the  European Community spoke  with  one  voice  on 
trade affairs-was concluded. 
1968 
On July  1,  1968,  a  full  customs  union  was  established,  pro-
viding free  trade for agricultural  and  manufactured  products 
throughout the Community. 
1969 
The  Community's  partnership  with  Africa  was  confi~med 
through  renewal  of  the  second  Association  Treaty  with  18 
independent  African countries.  Following  a  summit  meeting 
in  The Hague  between  the  Governments of the  Six  in  early 
December,  the  Community was  given  a  new  impetus.  Main 
objectives  were  fixed  and  a  timetable  set  for:  monetary 
union,  full  economic  union,  and  the  strengthening  and  en-
largement of the Community. 
1970 
The Council of Ministers further developed The Hague meet-
ing proposals, including a decision to strengthen the budgetary 
role of the European Parliament. 
March 25, 1958, the signing of the Rome Treaty creating the European Economic Community. 12 
Vision and Reality 20 Years Later 
DEREK  PRAG 
Derek Prag,  direc10r  of the Commission's  London Press and Infor-
mation  Office,  expresses  in  this  article  a  personal  viewpoint.  He 
has  been  involved with  the  Communities,  first  as  a  iouma/ist and 
later  as  a  Community  civil  servant,  since  1953. 
THE  MONNET-SCHUMAN  CONCEPT  has  been  attacked,  if  not 
written  off,  many  times,  and  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  For 
the  nationalists,  the  idea  of  pooling  sovereignty  in  a  wider 
grouping  was  and  is  anathema.  They see  the  nation-state  as 
the summit of human organization and political  achievement. 
It is  no accident that they are strongest in  Britain and France, 
for  these  are  the  oldest  of  Western  Europe's  nation-states, 
with  long  and  deep-rooted  national,  and  indeed  imperial, 
traditions. 
To  convince  federalists,  who  believe  that  Europe  must 
unite  politically  as  well  as  economically  in  order  to  have 
influence in  a world of superpowers, the dependence of prog-
ress  on  the  goodwill  of  the  member  states'  governments, 
despite  the  federal-seeming  structure  of  the  Community's 
institutions,  is  a  continual  source  of disappointment.  During 
the bleakest years, from the 1965 crisis to  1969, when progress 
was  slow  and  technical,  disappointment  deepened  into  black 
pessimism. It has, in fact, always been clear that the opposition 
of just one member government to  the  fundamental  concept 
of integration was enough to  hold up major progress towards 
economic and political union. 
Among the Six,  France's opposition from  1965  to  1969 to 
the  Community concept-the concept  of integration  with  a 
strong  Commission  and  generalized  majority  voting  in  the 
Council  of Ministers-has been  the  strongest  manifested  so 
far. It was also the only one to have been, as  it were, ideologi-
cally  formulated,  but  it  has  been  by  no  means  isolated  or 
unique.  Even  in  its  early days,  the  European Coal  and Steel 
Community  High  Authority's  power  over  coal  and  steel 
rubbed  abrasively  against  the skins  of national  governments. 
There was  an  inherent conflict  between the  High  Authority's 
limited  supranational  powers  over  coal  and  steel  and  the 
sovereignty  retained  by  the  national  governments  in  other 
fields.  It was  the  government of Mendes-France,  not that of 
General de Gaulle, which provoked Jean Monnct's resignation 
from  the  Presidency of the  High  Authority. One  also  recalls 
the  tough  German  stand  against  the  break-up  of  the  Ruhr 
coal  cartel  and  Dutch  intransigence,  over  many  years,  on 
transport. In the European Economic Community, Germany's 
national  interests  have  been  defended  to  the  bitter  end  on 
farm prices  (for grain and milk), and Italy's on a Community 
policy for wine production and marketing. 
The extraordinary thing is  not that the  Community institu-
tions  were  unable  to  overcome  national  resistances  more 
quickly,  but that anyone should have expected  these  national 
interests  to  disappear  overnight  in  the  general  Community 
interest. 
The virtue  of the  Community system,  then,  lies  not  in  its 
quasi-federal  structure  but  in  the  ability  of its  quasi-federal 
Wreath-laying  ceremonies  outside  the  Commission's  headquarters 
in  Brussels  on  May  5.  The  monument  bears  the  inscription: 
"Robert Schuman,  pioneer of European  Unity,  1886-1963," in the 
four official languages of the  Community, here  in  German. institutions,  in  certain  circumstances,  to  make  real  and  sub-
stantial  progress  towards  integration.  It lies  in  the  ability  of 
those  institutions to act-to crystallize common views  out of 
diversity,  to  formulate  policies,  to  make  decisions,  and  to 
execute those  decisions  once  they  have  been  made. The  fact 
that  their  action  will  be  faster  or slower,  depending  on  the 
amount of good  will  displayed  by  the  national  governments, 
is  important but not, in  the  long run, crucial. For the  institu-
tions  remain,  ready  to  push  through  new  common  policies 
when the right circumstances come about. 
Institutions'  Key  Role 
This  was  surely  what  Jean  Monnet  meant  when  he  wrote: 
"Men pass,  others will  come and replace us.  We  cannot hand 
down  to  them  our  personal  experience,  which  will  vanish 
with us.  What we  can hand down to  them is  our institutions. 
The  life  of  institutions  is  longer  than  that  of  men,  and 
in~titutions, if  they are well  constructed, can thus accumulate 
and transmit wisdom to successive generations." 
But  are  the  present  Community  institutions  well  con-
structed? Our answer depends  on  the  criteria we  adopt.  The 
good  federalist-and  perhaps  many  others-will  judge  by 
whether  the  institutions  are able  to  cope,  speedily  and eJiec-
tively,  wi.th  the problems of a continent whose industrial  and 
technological  power and political  influence  have  been  declin-
ing  relative to those of the superpowers. They will  also  judge 
by  whether  Western  Europe's  great  economic  wealth  and 
potential  are  being  reflected  in  her  industrial  and  political 
position  in  the  world.  On  the  basis  of  these  criteria,  the 
answer  is  clear:  the  Community  system,  at  its  present stage 
of development, is both cumbersome and inadequate, covering 
only a limited politico-economic field. 
In comparison with  the  United States,  which  has  a  popu-
lation comparable in size,  the Community lacks both a strong 
executive  and  adequate  democratic  control,  and  it  has  no 
competence  to  deal  with  most  political  events  where  the 
world's  important  decisions  are  made.  In  the  Community, 
national  governments  retain  the  full  panoply  of sovereignty. 
The instruments of enforcement (the defense and police forces 
and  the  judiciary)  and  the  symbols  of power  and  authority 
(such  as  flags  and  postage  stamps)  remain  firmly  under 
national  control. 
Practically all major appointments in political and economic 
affairs-including the  appointment of the  Commission  mem-
bers themselves-are  made by  the national governments. The 
governments,  backed  by  their  civil  services-infinitely  more 
numerous  than  the  Communities'-form  a  massive  vested 
interest. Against it, the almost unanimous pressure of industry 
and labor unions  for  faster  progress towards  economic union 
has  normally  faced  an  uphill  battle.  If the  Commission  is 
strong,  it  is  because  the  governments wish  it  to  be  strong:  if 
it  is  weak,  it  is  because the governments wish  it  to  be  weak. 
If we  are at all  serious  about European union-or indeed 
about the future of Europe-our ultimate yardstick must be: 
what  is  really  necessary  to  enable  Europe  to  speak  with  a 
single voice in the world? 
Realism  and  Reality 
Nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  Europe  will  continue  to 
mean little in the world as  long as  she  fails to provide herself 
with the means of formulating common policies and of making 
and executing common decisions. But the world  in  which we 
operate  is  at  the  moment  unreceptive  to  the  realism  and 
idealism needed to give  Europe the means of speaking with a 
single voice. Britain's leaders, on several  occasions,  and those 
of France and  Germany  at  the  last  Franco-German  summit 
talks,  have  said  unequivocally  that  they  do  not  envisage  a 
federal  or  supranational  solution  for  political  unity.  This 
means  that,  in  present  circumstances,  politics  being  the  art 
of the possible, we need a second yardstick. 
Monnet  and  Schuman  were  fully  aware  of  the  need  for 
the  second  yardstick,  to  measure what  is  politically  possible. 
Visionary  realists  though  they  were,  they  could  never  have 
made  such  an  impact on European history  if  they  had  not, 
both  of them,  been  firmly  rooted  in  the  realities  of politics 
and  power.  Monnet,  who  conceived  the  Schuman  plan,  had 
held a series of key posts  involving such  highly  delicate tasks 
as  the joint purchase of arms in  the United States for Britain 
and France and culminating in  the leadership of the  French 
planning  commission,  the  Commissariat  au  Plan,  before  he 
became the first President of the Ecsc High Authority in  1952. 
Schuman, who made the Coal and Steel Community a political 
reality,  remained  French  Foreign  Minister  for  five  years 
through numerous changes of government.  No idle  Utopians, 
these. 
If they  had  been,  they  could  not  have  seized  what  was 
perhaps the one moment in  European history when their plans 
had a good chance of being adopted. In  1950 Western Europe 
was deeply aware of the Russian menace, following the Com-
munist  coup  in  Czechoslovakia  and  the  threat  to  Berlin. 
Federalist  movements  had  grown  up  among  the  Resistance 
in  the  occupied  countries,  and  there  were  in  power  in  Ger-
many  and  Italy  two  men,  Konrad  Adenauer  and  Alcide  de 
Gasperi, who,  frontiersmen  like  Luxembourg-born  Schuman, 
were  determined  to  ensure  that Europe  never again  engaged 
in  fratricidal war.  And, waiting in  the wings  in  Belgium, was 
the  man who was  later to  play  the  dominant  role  in  shaping 
the EEC Treaty-Paul Henri Spaak. 
The Schuman  declaration of May 9,  1950,  makes  it  clear 
that Monnet and Schuman were aware, from the start, of the 
two  wavelengths  on  which  they  would  have  to  operate.  On 
the  wavelength  of  visionary  realism:  "These  proposals  will 
build the  first  concrete foundations  of the  European  Federa-
tion which is  indispensable to the preservation of peace." Coal 
and steel  were  placed clearly  in  the  political  context.  On  the 
wavelength  of  practical  possibilities:  "Europe  will  not  be 
made  all  at  once,  or in  a  single,  all  embracing construction. 
It will  be  built  through  concrete  achievements,  which  first 
create a de facto solidarity." 
Sovereign  and  Democratic 
The twenty years of struggle to unite  Europe are more easily 
comprehensible in the light of this duality of purpose, though 
the  threads  running through  them  remain  strangely constant. 
"The  Community  needs  a  truly  sovereign  and  democratic 
parliament, not a bastard assembly which cannot and may not 
do  anything .... Real  European unity  will  only be  achieved 
when  the  European  institutions  are  made  responsible  to  the  13 elected parliament of a European nation." Jean Rey or Joseph 
Luns,  1970? No-German Bundestag member Carlo Schmid, 
in  the Bundestag debate on ratification of the Coal  and  Steel 
Community Treaty, 1951. 
Improving  the  System 
Few  would  deny  the  shortcomings  of  the  present  system-
certainly not those who are  faced  with  the  task of making it 
work,  particularly  when  there  are  ten  member countries  in-
stead of six. The most important need is  for greater democratic 
control. In spite of the increase in  the Parliament's budgetary 
powers in  recent months,  its  control over the development of 
the Community remains minimal; and only direct elections of 
its  members  can  give  it  the  basis  in  popular  feeling  it  so 
badly  needs. 
Secondly,  decisions  must  be  made  and  carried  out  more 
speedily. The log-jam of drafts before the Council of Ministers 
could be  broken by extending the range of matters subject to 
majority voting,  and inaction and endless debates avoided by 
applying  the  majority  rule  more  rigorously.  The  operation 
of  the  Commission  could  be  streamlined  by  modifying  the 
present  collegial  system  which  requires  all  decisions  to  be 
taken by  the  Commission  as  a  whole; its  members  could  be 
given departmental responsibilities,  and some of the Commis-
sion's  wide-ranging  functions  delegated  to  agencies  (for  ex-
ample, its  role in  the anti-trust field  could be carried out by a 
Community Monopolies and Cartels  Bureau operating under 
Commission supervision). The Parliament could be  given the 
The  14-man  Commission,  though  unwieldy  and  cumbersome  in 
size,  still managed to  make decisions.  This  is  the  first  meeting of 
the  Commission,  on September  10,  1969,  in  its  new  Berlaimont 
headquarters in  Brussels.  (The  fifteenth  person  seated at  the  table 
is  the secretary general of the Commission.) 
right of appeal to the Court of Justice against Treaty infringe-
ments or even of making a decision if the Council persistently 
remained inactive. 
Finally,  a  gentle  move  towards  more  effective  representa-
tion of the Community interest could be  made by strengthen-
ing  the  Commission  and  by  giving  it  the  exclusive  power to 
make proposals on matters subject to  the  three Communities. 
These are the kind of "concrete achievements" which would 
take  the  Communities  a  little  closer  towards  those  laudable 
general aims  of economic  and  political  union  to  which  most 
national  politicians pay lip  service but whose  implementation 
few have so  far envisaged in  practical terms-and one day  to 
the  "European Federation" capable of decisive  action  and  of 
influencing the course of world affairs. 
Concrete  Achievement 
By  any standards, the  achievement  of  Monnet and Schuman 
in  the  20 years  since  May  9,  1950,  is  impressive.  They  re-
versed the course of European history from  fragmentation to 
voluntary  unification.  The  institutions  they  created  remain 
substantially valid. A whole body of Community law, superior 
to  national law, has been created. A  customs union  has been 
set  up  which,  since  The  Hague  summit  conference  of  last 
December,  has  put on  a  spectacular  turn  of speed  towards 
economic  and  monetary union.  The decision  has  been  made 
to  give  the Community institutions their own  source of reve-
nue. The Community, if not irreversible,  is  par.t  of life  in  the 
Six-indeed  in  Western  Europe  as  a  whole.  With  its  fast 
growth  rate  and  rapidly  rising  prosperity,  it  is  a  basic  com-
ponent of the  framework  in  which all  sections of the  people 
operate: the ministers who meet almost every week in Brussels 
and Luxembourg; the industrialists who plan,  invest  and pro-
duce for a single  market of 187  million  people  and expect a 
single  economic,  financial,  and  industrial  policy  for  a  single 
economy;  and  the labor unions who  almost unanimously see 
the  Community  as  a  potential  major  instrument  of  social 
welfare. 
Above  all,  there  is  hardly  anyone  in  the  Six-outside the 
Communist parties-who believes  that  there  is  any  practical 
way towards European union except by  building on, strength-
ening,  and  streamlining  the  existing  Community  structure. 
The Community system  has  many imperfections.  But no  one 
has  yet found  a  better way  of reconciling  the  general  Com-
munity  interest  with  the  national  interests  of  the  member 
states, of reconciling divergent viewpoints between the member 
states, and of resolving deadlock, than the Commission-Council 
"dialogue"-the  process  by  which  the  Commission  submits 
proposals to the Council, in which  the national  ministers dis-
cuss them,  in  the  Commission's  presence,  until  the  Commis-
sion, in the light of the views expressed, drafts a final  proposal 
which the Ministers accept. 
Churchill  once  said  that  parliamentary  democracy,  with 
practically every  imaginable  fault,  is  the  best  system  of gov-
ernment  we  know.  Perhaps  the  measure  of  the  success  of 
Monnet-Schuman  Europe,  with  all  its  faults,  is  that  if  they 
had not  invented  it  we  should  have had  to  devise  something 
remarkably  similar  in  order  even  to  approach  the  results  it 
has achieved. Europeans Vote for Europe 
WITHOUT  ANY  ELECTION  CAMPAIGN  or balloting,  almost with· 
out realizing  it,  Europeans  have  voted  for  a  united  Europe. 
A  public opinion poll,  the first  of its  kind,  was  conducted 
in January and February in the six countries of the European 
Community  and  Great  Britain  by  a  group  of  information 
organizations.* It was made independently, but at the sugges-
tion  of the  Press  and  Information  Service  of  the  European 
Communities Commission. 
The  12,000-person  sampling  was  representative  of  the 
voting-age  population  (21  in  the  Community,  18  in  Great 
Britain)  in each of the countries surveyed. 
The questions and answers,  expressed in percentages, were 
as follows: 
Are  you  for  or  against  the  development  of  the  Common 
Market  into  a  United  States of Europe? 
G 
For ............................  69 
Against......................  9 

















I  GB 
60  30 
7  48 
33  22 
Are you  for  or  against  Great  Britain's  entry  into  the  Com-
mon Market? 
G 
For ·········--·-··--·-·--·-·--- 69 
Against -------·----····---··- 7 

















I  GB 
51  19 
9  63 
40  18 
Are you for or against the election of a European Parliament 
by  direct  universal  suffrage,  in  other  words,  a  parliament 
elected by citizens in every member country? 
G 
For ---------·-··-------·-·--·-- 66 
Against --------·---·-···-··-- 9 
No response ·-·-·----·---- 25 
B  N 
56  59 
11  21 









I  GB 
55  25 
6  55 
39  20 
Would you accept, above your own Government, a European 
Government,  responsible  for  a  common  policy  in  foreign, 
defense, and economic affairs? 
G 
Yes  -·---------------·-----···-- 57 
No  ------------------------·-·- 19 

















I  GB 
51  22 
10  60 
39  18 
In  the  event  of  the  election  of  a  President  of  the  United 
States of Europe by universal suffrage,  would you  vote for a 
candidate of a different nationality than your own if his per-
sonality and program fit  your ideas better than the candidates' 
of your own nationality? 
G  B  N  L  F  I  GB 
Yes----·--------············--- 69  52  63  67  61  45  39 
No  ---------------------------- 12  24  18  20  22  19  41 
No response ------·--··--- 19  24  19  13  17  36  20 
Divergent Continental and British Views 
The  answers  disclosed  a  considerable  difference  Ill the  atti-
tudes  of voters  in  the Common  Market and in Britain.  The 
majority of voters in  the Common Market countries favored 
the  political  formation  of the  United  States  of Europe,  the 
election of a European parliament by direct universal suffrage, 
and  the  formation  of  a  European  Government.  Except  in 
Italy, five  to seven voters out of ten said they would vote for 
a  President  of  the  United  States  of  Europe  of  a  different 
nationality than their own. Great Britain's membership in the 
Community  is  favored  by  five  to  seven  voters  out  of  ten, 
except in  the Netherlands where  eight  out of ten  voters  re-
sponded favorably. 
By  contrast, only  19  per cent of British  voters  now favor 
their country's membership  in  the  Common  Market,  against 
51  per cent in Italy and 79 per cent in the Netherlands. Rated 
from zero to 100 for pro-European attitudes, British responses 
were 30 points below the least pro-European Common Market 
country. Only for the question about the election of a foreign 
president  was  the  gap  narrower:  39  per  cent  favorable  in 
Great Britain,  against 45  per cent in  Italy,  and  69  per cent 
in Germany. 
Common Market Replies Similar 
The  second  noticeable  result  of  this  poll  was  the  similarity 
of the answers given by voters in the Common Market coun-
tries.  The nearer the countries, the less  the percentage varia-
tions:  in samplings of 1  ,200 to  2,000 persons, such variation 
was 2-3-per cent. 
The only significant differences between the Common Mar-
ket countries lay in the relatively stronger Dutch support for 
British membership and on the hesitance of Italian voters to 
subscribe to the election of a  foreign  President. 
Young Voters Most "European" 
A  breakdown of the results  showed that 
•  by age,  young voters are decidedly more enthusiastic about 
the  unification of Europe than older voters in every country 
and for almost every question 
•  by sex, women seemed less pro-European than men, mainly 
because they answered "no response"  more often 
•  by  occupation,  members  of  the  professions  and  manage-
ment more often expressed  pro-European  opinions  than  did 
blue collar workers or, especially, farmers. 
By  age,  the following  percentages of replies were  in  favor 
of European political unification: 
G  B  N  L  F  I  GB 
18  or 21-34  ---··----·--------74  58  65  72.5  65  60.5  36 
35-64  --··---------·---·-·---·----64  59  58  63  60  53  29 
65  and over ···------------- 52  39  51.5  59  49  34  19 
* Het Laatste Nieuws, covered Belgium and Luxembourg with  the 
assistance of the International Research Associates (INRA). Magazin 
and  Zweites  Deutsches  Fernsehen,  covered  Germany  and  West 
Berlin  with  the  help of the  lnstitut fur  Demoskopie, d'Allensbach. 
Paris-Match covered France  with  the  help of the  lnstitut Franr;ais 
d'Opinion  Publique.  Epoca  covered  Italy  with  the  help  of  the 
DOXA  Institute.  De  Telegraaf  covered  the  Netherlands,  with  the 
help of the  lnstitut  Weldkamp.  The Daily Express covered Great 
Britain  with  the help of the  Louis Harris  Research  Institute.  15 16 
Monnet on  Political Uni y 
"UNITED  EUROPE  IS  ON  THE  WAY." 
This article has been  adapted from  the  transcript of Edwin  New-
man's interview  with  Jean  Monnet  for  the  National  Broadcasting 
Company's  "Speaking  Freely,"  on  February  8,  1970.  No  part  of 
this  television  interview  may  be  reproduced  without  the  written 
permission  of the  National  Broadcasting  Company,  Mr.  Monnet, 
and Mr. Newman. 
NEWMAN:  Is  a  United States of Europe more than  a dream? 
MONNET:  The United States of Europe began  with a  dream, 
but  today  it  is  happening.  The dream  may  belong  to  a  few 
people,  but the mass  of people  are  pushed  by  necessity.  The 
United States of Europe are  too small  to  have  by themselves 
the resources that the United States or Russia have.  To solve 
some of their economic problems,  they  must  unite.  The best 
partner of a united Europe is  necessity. 
NEWMAN:  Are there natural boundaries to  this  United States 
of Europe? 
MONNET:  I wouldn't put it in terms of boundaries. The limits 
of states  of Europe  are  determined  by  the  fact  that certain 
nations accept the same rules and the same institutions as  the 
others.  The  frontier  is  a  consequence  of  the  acceptance  by 
the  citizens  of the  same rules  and the  same  institutions,  and 
of a  common  background.  The  necessity  of extending  these 
limits  is  clear, but these limits  are  determined not by us,  or 
anybody, but rather by the willingness of the people to accept 
the  same rules,  as  within  one country. 
NEWMAN:  Mr.  Monnet, there is,  I think, some cynicism about 
the movement toward a European political union, or a United 
States of Europe.  Has  real  progress  been  made? 
MONNET:  Some people do take a cynical view, but with many 
other people it's impatience. I personally think this  European 
Community  will  result  from  constant,  progressive  changes, 
from  the  states  in  which  the  nations  are,  into  what  in  time 
will be a community, political as  well  as  economic. To accept 
rules  governing  their  political  attitudes,  people  have  to  feel 
they have a common interest. If there is  no common interest, 
a  political  authority  cannot  be  created  in  the  abstract.  The 
Common Market is  only a customs union, but by creating an 
economic  and  monetary  union,  and  seeking  solutions  for 
common  problems,  the  need  for  a  political  authority  will 
come.  They're on  the  way.  You can  see  for  yourself what's 
happening in Brussels. 
NEWMAN:  What brought you into the European union move-
ment? 
MONNET:  A  person's  actions  often  depend  on  his  tempera-
ment. Nature has made me one way-the way I think, of the 
problem I  have to solve and the way I think best to  solve it. 
I have been convinced for  a long  time that the old forms  of 
individual action were not enough. Your question brings back 
memories. When the war of 1914 began, both the French and 
the British were mobilizing, but each as  if there were separate 
wars. It seemed silly to have the French and the British acting 
separately,  so  I  suggested  that  they  join  together  and  act 
together.  That seems  a  very  big  thing  to  say  today,  but  at 
that time ideas were  scarce,  and those  who governed  nations 
were glad to have an idea. They pooled their resources, espe-
cially  their ships.  The  Germans were  sinking  ships,  and the 
great  question  for  the  suppliers  in  Europe  and  France  was 
whether or not they would have ships.  Instead of the  British 
giving ships to  France, an organization was created, based on 
the  principle of equal  treatment.  The  amount  of food,  coal, 
and supplies of all  kinds  that the  French would  receive  was 
determined  by  common  agreement,  and  the  ships  to  trans-
port them  were  allocated by  a  transport council.  I  think my 
temperament pushes me  in  that direction. 
NEWMAN:  Suppose one has  such  a temperament and says  to 
himself, "I think there should be  a United States of Europe." 
How  does  one  go  about  attaining  it? 
MONNET:  My  good  fortune  has  been  that  circumstances 
brought about an association  between events  and myself:  the 
thought that was  natural to me,  for  joint action,  was  foreign 
to  most  people.  As  problems  can  only  be  solved  by  joint 
action,  the Governments were  willing  to listen  to  me.  I  also 
said  I  was  associated  with  events.  After the  first  war,  I  was 
appointed Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations. 
There I  became  convinced  that  action  by  nations  could  not 
be  taken  by  good  will  only,  that something more was  neces-
sary. That "something more" lay at the heart of the principles 
on  which  relationships  between  nations  were  built:  national 
sovereignty.  For joint action, nations had to delegate part of 
their sovereignty  on specific  points  to  European  institutions. 
This is  what was  done in  coal  and steel  and in  the Common 
Market. 
I  had to  leave  the  League  of Nations  for  personal  family 
reasons.  Time  passed.  I  was  in  business.  When  the  last  war 
came about,  I  felt  I  had to try to  bring the  French and the 
British into joint action, which I did. After Dunkirk, after the 
French Army was defeated, it became clear to me  that if the 
French  were  to  have  hope  in  the  future  instead  of  being 
merely  defeated,  the  French  and  the  British  had  to  join  in 
common action. It was then, in  1940, that I suggested to Mr. 
Churchill  that  Britain  offer  France  partnership,  the  same 
parliament, one state,  one citizenship. It was  too late,  unfor-
tunately.  Mr.  Churchill  accepted  the  idea,  but  the  French 
Government  was  changed.  Marshal  Petain  came  to  power, 
and it was finished. 
The British appointed me  a  member of the  British Supply 
Council, the official  organization in  Washington that supplied 
all  that Great Britain needed to stay in  the war. As  a member 
of  this  Council,  I  was  associated  with  the  war  effort  and, 
when  America came into the war, with the determination of 
arms supplies, I worked with Harry Hopkins, who was a close 
asso:;iate  of  President  Roosevelt,  and  others.  We  drew  up 
what  was  called  the  Big  Three  Program  which  the  United 
States  adopted  after  Pearl  Harbor,  and  it  probably  made  a 
great  difference  in  turning  the  war.  Then,  I  went  to  North 
Africa,  where  I  was  a  member  of  the  French  Liberation 
Committee.  All  this  associated  me  with  great  events  and 
people  in  authority. 
NEWMAN:  How  much  do  individuals  have  to  do  with  the 
forwarding of these great movements? 
MONNET:  Individuals  are  always  important,  but  the  institu-
tions  which  enable  men  to  act  are  fundamental.  Men  are 
important in  the  changes;  institutions  are  essential  in  main-
taining the changes. For instance, the Schuman plan for coal 
and steel  and the Common Market probably would not have Jean  Monnet  on  June  8,  1961,  when  Cambridge  University 
awarded him an  honorary  degree. 
taken  place  without  the  action  of  some  individuals.  There 
were  changes:  from  national  to  European.  Treaties were  ne-
gotiated  between  the  six  nations  and  voted  by  parliament. 
Institutions  to  carry  out  these  changes  were  set  up.  (It's 
interesting  to  see  that  institutions  are  necessarily  conserva-
tive.)  Change  must  come  from  the  individual;  maintenance 
must  come  from  institutions,  and  difficulties  disappear  from. 
the  scene  of creation  to  give  room  and  place  to  those  who 
will  carry out. 
NEWMAN:  You've  raised  what  is  to  some  people  a  funda-
mental point about the Common Market and all  such  move-
ments:  that  institutions  are  necessarily  conservative.  Some 
people  think  that  when you  create  something  like  the  Com-
mon Market, you simply create another layer of bureaucracy. 
MONNET:  I  don't disagree completely,  but I  wouldn't put on 
this  question  the  emphasis  which  you  now  put.  People  talk 
of bureaucracy as  if it  were  an  evil;  it  is  a  necessity.  It's  im-
portant  to  see  that  bureaucracy  is  kept  within  bounds,  but 
you  couldn't  run  public  affairs  without  a  bureaucracy,  an 
organization of people that devote .themselves  to  public  good 
instead  of individual  good.  That's  what  bureaucracy  means. 
You see it every day in  the difficulties they meet to surmount 
problems  of  change  in  industry,  agriculture,  and  economic 
relations. 
NEWMAN:  In the movement toward European political union, 
are  you  helped  by  the  fact  that  Germany  is  divided? 
MONNET:  You're asking a question that I never asked  myself. 
Germany  is  unfortunately  divided,  but  we  have  to  act  with 
the conditions as  they are.  I'm inclined to think it would  not 
make a  fundamental difference. If this  Community works,  as 
it  is  working,  it  is  the  result  of  each  nation's  strength  and 
contribution. You must think in  terms of the Community, not 
in  terms of the  various  nations  forming  it.  This  Community 
is  in  the  process  of  changing  gradually  this  national  notion 
so  that if Germany were united, as  one day I  hope it will  be, 
we  mustn't  think in  terms  of Germany  as  such,  but of  the 
contribution-greater if  united  or Jess  if  not-to a  Commu-
nity to  which France and  other nations  bring their contribu-
tion-and England  I  hope. 
NEWMAN:  Has there been a  fundamental change in  the  rela-
tions between France  and Germany? 
MONNET:  I think so.  I  think so from  talking with the French 
and from  a  recent poll  (see  page  15 ).  Sixty per cent or more 
of  the  French  people  questioned  were  in  favor  of  creating 
Europe and said they would  rather have  a  non-French Presi-
dent if his  program were  better than  the French candidate's. 
They didn't say,  "We'd accept  a  President if he's  not a  Ger-
man."  They  said,  "We  would  accept  a  President  who  was 
not a Frenchman." 
France and Germany are now inter-states of mutual action 
and  understanding.  A  common  interest  has  been  built,  and 
through  it,  gradually,  a  common  view  of  their  destiny.  The 
thought  of opposition,  as  I  knew  it  before  the  war,  doesn't 
come up anymore. 
NEWMAN:  President de  Gaulle was not a  friend of European 
political  union,  but did  he  make  a  contribution  to  the  new 
feeling  between France  and Germany?  17 18 
MONNET:  I  think  he  did.  It's  difficult  to  discuss  de  Gaulle 
at this  stage.  He is  not an  actor any more,  and therefore it's 
not  fair  or  appropriate  to  discuss  him.  While  General  de 
Gaulle was,  by his  own  nature, opposed  to the  idea of dele-
gating  sovereignty,  he  was  not  opposed  to  the  Common 
Market as  such.  He and some of his  colleagues  thought that 
France  should  not  revert  to  the  old  times  of  protectionism 
and  saw  in  the  Common  Market  a  protection  against  pro-
tectionism.  To  that  extent,  he  contributed  to  the  establish-
ment of the Common Market and to good  relations  between 
France  and  Germany.  Whether  it  had  that  effect  or not,  I 
think he thought that. 
NEWMAN:  One  of the  great  hopes  in  post-war  Europe  was 
a  European  army,  a  European  defense  community,  which 
failed.  The  French  parliament  did  not  accept  it.  Was  it  a 
realistic idea at the time, and should we expect to see it again? 
MONNET:  Not  today,  but some  day,  when  the  nations  feel 
that their destiny is  common, that all  their interests are com-
mon. On the eve of a political union, the question of common 
defense  will  arise.  We're on the  road to  unity;  someday that 
question will  have to be dealt with.  When the proposal for  a 
European  army was  defeated  in  1954 by  the French parlia-
ment,  it  was  a  sentimental  feeling.  They  had  accepted  the 
idea of coal and steel and were on the way to economic inte-
gration. When the question of the European army was  asked, 
they did not see a European army, but a German army which 
revived the feeling that they had been deeply hurt during the 
war.  There was  a  reaction  against the  thought of a  German 
army. I, for my part, very much regret this decision. It would 
have been  far better if all  the people of Europe had  been  in 
the same uniform. 
NEWMAN:  Do  you  expect  Britain  to  enter  the  Common 
Market? 
MONNET:  Yes  I do.  The British need to come into the Com-
mon  Market to have  competition  on a  large  scale.  There  is 
only one  Common  Market so  that if Britain  wants to adjust 
to  modern  conditions,  she  has  to  join  it  and  give  up  the 
illusion  of being  able  to  solve  her  problems  by  herself.  In 
1950, when  the Coal and Steel  Community was  put forward 
with  the  idea  of getting  those  European  nations  together,  I 
went to London with  Robert Schuman.  We  asked the  British 
to join but they would not. They said, "We will  negotiate, but 
we will  not accept the objective." The objective was the pool-
ing of resources. The British were not convinced by our idea; 
they wanted  to  see  whether  it  worked.  We  had  nothing  but 
the argument and the idea; we  couldn't offer the vision of its 
working. The British need facts to convince themselves.  I was 
convinced at that time that the day would come when, seeing 
it had succeeded, they would  join. This day  has  come today. 
Now,  when  the  British  join,  they  will  bring  their  resources, 
their capacity for invention and so on, and will strengthen the 
Community. They will  strengthen  it  for still  another reason: 
the British understand better than the Europeans (Continental, 
I  mean)  the value of institutions.  Institutions are essential  to 
them.  Men  are important, but they believe  that men  without 
institutions  won't work.  The  British  will  bring  that  view  to 
the  Community.  They  will  also  bring  a  preoccupation  with 
the  part  this  European  Community  will  play  in  the  world. 
The  British  have  been  used  to  thinking  in  world  terms  for 
so  many years.  Today they want to  come into this  Common 
Market not only for economic  reasons but also  because they 
think they cannot by themselves  have a  real  influence  in  the 
world  but  that  with  Europe  they  can.  They  may  want  to 
Anglicise  the  Community,  but the French are  the same,  and 
the  Germans also.  Something will  emanate from  this  sort of 
competition. 
NEWMAN:  Might  political  progress within the Common Mar-
ket  go  faster  without  the  British?  Will  it  complicate  the 
political task  if they  come in?  And the  Danes,  and the Nor-
wegians, and the Irish? 
MONNET:  (Laughing.)  I  prefer to  deal  first  with  the  British. 
That's difficult enough.  Right  now the British are outside, so 
they  judge  problems  according  to  their  own  standards.  The 
moment  they're  in,  they  will  be  a  part  of the  Community, 
and  the  problems  will  be  common  problems  and  they  will 
join  in  settling  them.  Britain's  or  anybody  else's  coming  in 
will  bring changes,  thus difficulties,  but it  will  make  possible 
things that otherwise would  not be. 
NEWMAN:  The  amount of American investment in  the  econ-
omy of Western Europe has alarmed some people who see in 
it the  possibility,  indeed the reality,  of American domination. 
Does that worry you? 
MONNET:  I  don't think the  Americans seek  domination,  but 
efficiency.  However,  it  is  also  a  fact,  that the  money  being 
used  by you to invest in  Europe, comes mainly from  Europe. 
At the same time,  these  investments  are  not all  bad, because 
they  create  competition  in  Europe.  Generally  the  feeling  in 
Europe  is  not  favorable  to  American  investments  as  such, 
but it is  an  incentive to Europeans to increase their efforts to 
produce  better,  to  compete  with  American  production.  The 
answer  lies  with  the  Europeans  whether  they  will  make  the 
effort, with their intelligence, knowledge, and money, to create 
large companies, joining French and German, or French and 
Italian,  instead  of  remaining  purely  national.  Mergers  will 
soon  be  across  frontiers  and  will  produce  competition  that 
you  will  have to take into account. That's good for you,  too, 
because  it  will  force  you  to  make  an  effort. 
NEWMAN:  What  should  the  American  attitude  he  toward  a 
European  political  union,  a  United States  of Europe? 
MONNET:  The  attitude  of  the  United  States  Government  so 
far  has been in  favor  of a  United States  of Europe,  but re-
cently  its  expression  of opinion  has  not  been  as  vivid  as  it 
once was. I think your country will be in  favor of Europe and 
of  European  integration  if  we  march  forward.  Action  will 
move you,  not words. The American attitude  will  depend on 
us.  Like everything else,  we  must make up our mind what to 
do  ourselves,  and the rest follows. 
The  creation  of  Europe  is  in  the  interest  of  the  world. 
Peace  will  be  helped  by  the  creation  of large  units,  dealing 
with one another as  equals,  and none of them as  a  superior. 
Competition must come not only industrially by mergers  but 
also  politically  by  the  creation  of  large  units.  Europe  is,  I 
think,  but one  step  toward  the  reorganization  of the  world 
along that line. COMMUNITY  NEWS 
COMMON MARKET  GETS  SCHUMAN  DAY  MESSAGE 
FROM  PRESIDENT  NIXON 
The President of the European Communities, 
Jean Rey,  on  May  8  in  Brussels,  received  a 
message  from  President  Richard  M.  Nixon 
supporting  the  "'broadening  and  strengthen-
ing"  of  the  European  Community,  on  the 
occasion of the  twentieth anniversary of the 
Schuman Plan Declaration. 
The White House message coincided with 
observances being held in Brussels, capital of 
the  Common Market,  and  elsewhere  in  the 
six-nation  Community marking the  anniver-
sary  of the declaration  by  Robert Schuman 
(see page 3.) 
President Nixon said: 
"'.  .  .  I  reaffirm  the  full  support  of  the 
United States for the renewed effort of broad-
ening and strengthening the European Com-
munity.  It  is  my  hope  that  the  remarkable 
strides of the past twenty  years  will  be sur-
passed  by future  achievements and that Eu-
rope  will  play  an  even  greater  role  in  that 
task of overriding importance, the building of 
a secure and peaceful world." 
President Rey replied: 
" ...  My colleagues and I deeply appreciate 
the full  support which the United States has 
always  given  to  the  efforts  made to achieve 
European integration. They therefore realize 
the significance of your good wishes for the 
enlargement and strengthening of the Euro-
pean Community. On their behalf and on my 
own I thank you most warmly for this gesture 
of solidarity, which touches us very much at 
this  particularly  important point  in  our de-
velopment." 
BUSINESS  IS  BRISK  BUT  INFLATION  LOOMS 
Unemployment  was  low  and  the  Common 
Market's  economy  was  humming  in  early 
1970,  but  inflationary  pressures  were  grow-
ing,  according  to  the  Commission.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Community's  trade  balance 
with non-member countries had deterioriated. 
The  Commission,  in  its  first  quarterly 
economic  survey  for  1970,  released  on 
April  24,  also  reported  that  the  growth  of 
real  gross  Community  product  from  1969 
to  1970,  at  5.5  per  cent,  would  be  higher 
than  forecast  in  the  last  quarterly  survey. 
It said that imports from non-member coun-
tries would soar in 1970 while exports would 
show only a  modest rise. 
Although business boomed,  the  rapid  rise 
in overall demand slowed a little as demand 
from major non-member countries slackened 
and private consumption temporarily leveled 
off.  Still,  the  slower  pace  of  production 
growth was putting pressure on supply.  The 
supply  lag  was  due,  among  other  things, 
to  acute  labor  shortages,  bad  weather,  and 
industrial  disputes  (particularly  in  Italy). 
Prices of both goods and  services  rose  as a 
result  of  the  pressure  of  demand  and  in-
creased  costs. 
As the  Community's balance  on  external 
trade declined, its capital account has showed 
heavy  deficits,  mainly  due  to  massive  out-
flows of capital from Germany following re-
evaluation  of  the  mark.  Official  gold  and 
foreign exchange reserves, therefore. dropped 
sharply. 
Outlook  for  the  Remainder  of  1970 
The  Commission  felt  that  the  growth  of 
external  demand  was  likely  to  slacken 
further as the  world's business  climate  con-
tinued to cool. Internal demand. in contrast, 
may expand more vigorously  than  expected, 
especially  in  the  first  half of  the  year,  the 
Commission  said. 
Private consumer  expenditure,  in  particu-
lar,  should  rise  appreciably,  and  investment 
activity  was  expected  to  remain  at  a  high 
level.  Thus,  the  Commission  thought  the 
expansion  of  demand  would  continue  to 
outstrip  possibilities  for an  increase  in  pro-
duction,  though in  the  second  half of  1970 
the  gap  between  supply  and  demand  might 
narrow.  The  deficit  in  the  Communities' 
trade  balance  would  continue  to  grow,  de-
spite an improvement in  the terms of trade. 
In short-term economic  policy,  the  Com-
mission  stressed  that  the  restrictive  line  to 
curb  inflation,  recommended  by  the  Com-
mission  at  the  end  of  1969,  be  continued. 
These  recommendations  included  a  call  for 
stringent budget and tight monetary policies 
by  the  national  governments,  as  well  as 
development of economic and social policies 
to  ensure balanced economic  growth. 
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DENIS  DE  ROUGEMONT 
GETS  SCHUMAN  AWARD 
The  1970  Robert  Schuman  Award  for  dis-
tinction  in  promoting the  "European" spirit 
was  given  to  Denis de  Rougemont on April 
15,  at  the  University  of Bonn. 
Mr. de  Rougemont,  director of the Euro-
pean cultural  center  in  Geneva,  has written 
many books and articles supporting the uni-
fication  of Europe.  Among  his  best  known 
works on this subject  are:  L'attitude federa-
liste,  L'Europe  en  jeu,  and  L'Europe  et  sa 
culture. 
The  Schuman  Prize  of  25,000  German 
marks  ($7,000)  was created in  1966  by  the 
Freiherr von Stein  Foundation of Hamburg 
to  honor  the  memory  of  Robert  Schuman 
and  to  reward  men,  who  like  him,  have 
made outstanding contributions to the cause 
of European  unity.  The  other  recipients of 
the  award  have  been:  Jean  Monnet,  chair-
man of the Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe  and  initiator of the Schu-
man plan for pooling coal and steel; Joseph 
Bech,  who,  as  Luxembourg  Prime  Minister 
and  Minister for  Foreign and  External  Af-
fairs,  signed the Rome Treaties creating the 
European  Economic  and  Atomic  Energy 
Communities  (EEC  and  Euratom)  for  Lux-
embourg and  in  1958  belonged  to  the  EEC 
Council of Ministers; Sicco L. Mansholt, the 
architect  of  the  Common  Market's  farm 
policy,  and  Walter  Hallstein,  president  of 
the EEC  Commission  from  1958  until  1967, 
when  it  was  merged  with  the  executive 
bodies of Euratom  and  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community. 
BIGGER  QUOTAS  OFFERED 
PAKISTAN  AND  INDIA 
FOR  COTTON  TEXTILES 
Large  increases  in  the  European  Commu-
nity's import quotas for cotton textiles  have 
been  offered  India  and  Pakistan. 
During  talks,  in  Brussels,  with  India  on 
April  21-23  and with Pakistan on April 21c 
22,  the Commission made these offers.  The 
discussions  were preparatory  to  the renego-
tiation  later  this  year  of  the  Long-Term 
Arrangement  Concerning  Trade  in  Cotton 
Textiles originally negotiated in  1962  under 
the  auspices  of the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and  renewed  for 
three  years  in  1967.  The  textile  agreement 
was  designed  to promote orderly growth  in 
trade in  cotton textiles, an important export 
for  most  developing  countries. 
Problems  relative  to  the  Community's 
agreement  with  India  on  jute  and  cocoa 
were  also  discussed  with  the  Indian  delega-
tion.  19 20 
STRICT  ANTI-POLLUTION  RULES  FOR  MOTOR VEHICLES 
The  European  Common  Market,  following 
in the steps of the United States, has enacted 
strict  rules  to  fight  air  pollution  caused  by 
motor vehicles. 
The  European  Communities  Council  of 
Ministers on March 20  adopted three direc-
tives affecting the motor  industry.  The first, 
and most important, dealt with measures to 
control air pollution by exhaust fumes from 
internal  combustion  engines;  the  second, 
specifications  for fuel  tanks  and rear bump-
ers;  and  the  third,  the  positioning  of  rear 
license plates. 
These directives supplement those adopted 
February 6 on the harmonization of regula-
tions  governing  motor  vehicle  components, 
mechanical  specifications,  and  permissible 
levels of exhaust noise.  As a  result of these 
five  directives, a  strong start has been made 
towards  harmonizing  member  states'  laws 
covering  the  motor  industry  and  ensuring 
free  movement  of  vehicles  in  the  Com-
munity. Technical barriers, which are similar 
to customs barriers, are thus also disappear-
ing.  In  addition,  the  Council  has  before  it 
measures concerning steering, ease of access 
and exit,  horns, turn signals,  and brakes. 
Standards  Fitted  to  European  Cars 
The  directive  on  air  pollution  by  gasoline 
engines  was  sought  to  forestall  the  enact-
ment, or the coming into force, of a number 
of national laws in the member states, whose 
differences  would  have caused  series  obsta-
cles  to  trade  in  motor  vehicles. 
The  Council  adopted  European  methods 
of  air  pollution  measurement,  rather  than 
the  American,  after  comparison  of  the 
operating cycles and standards used as meas-
urement  showed  that  the  European  proce-
dures  were  more  suitable  for  European 
conditions.  The  American  cycle  is  based 
on  the  use  of  the  large  cubic  capacity 
American  vehicle  on American  urban  road 
systems,  neither  of  which  resemble  what 
is  found  in  Europe. The power:weight ratio 
of  European  mass-production  vehicles  is 
lower than American vehicles'  and  does not 
allow  compliance  with  the  necessary  accel-
eration  conditions  for  the  American  cycle. 
The American  regulations  are  meant  for  a 
much  more homogeneous  range  of vehicles 
than  exists  in  Europe  and  apply  primarily 
to  the  unburned  hydrocarbons,  while  in 
Europe  the  emphasis  is  on  cutting  down 
carbon  monoxide  exhaust.  Other  technical 
considerations  also  influenced  the  Council's 
choice. 
The directive  specifies  three  types of test 
that vehicles must pass: 
•  One  monitors  the  average  toxic  gas  ex-
haust in a congested urban area after starting 
from cold. 
•  The  second  measures  carbon  monoxide 
exhaust  when  the  engine  is  idling  (it  may 
not exceed  4.5  per cent of the  total  exhaust 
gasses). 
•  The third test  measures crankcase exhaust 
fumes. 
The directive  also  allows  for  prompt  re-
vision  of the  requirements  in  the  event  of 
new  technology. 
SIX  WARNED  TO  SPEED  UP 
RATIFICATION  OF  NEW 
YAOUNDE  CONVENTION 
Any  further  delay  in  ratifying  the  new 
Yaounde  Convention  could  have  serious 
political  repercussions  on  the  European 
Community's relations with its African asso-
ciates,  the Commission has warned,  since  it 
will  endager  the  continuity  of development 
aid  to the Eighteen. 
When the new Convention was signed last 
July 29, the ratification process was expected 
to  take  a  year  during  which  unused  aid 
funds  from  the  first  Yaounde  Convention 
were  to  be  carried  over.  However,  these 
funds  are  nearly exhausted,  and the  $1  bil-
lion  to be  provided under the r.ew  Conven-
tion  does  not  become  available  until  the 
ratification  process  has  been  completed.  As 
of  May  6  only  France,  of  the  Six,  had 
ratified  the  Convention,  while  14  of  the 
African  associates  had  done  so:  Rwanda, 
Central  African  Republic,  Mali,  Burundi. 
Gabon,  Togo,  Ivory  Coast,  the  Malagasy 
Republic,  Mauritania,  Niger,  Dahomey, 
Cameroon, Upper Volta,  and Chad. 
As a result of this delay,  the Commission 
decided at its April 14-15 meeting to suggest 
to  the  Council  of Ministers  that  the  Com-
munity  arrange  a  $6-million,  "stop-gap" 
fund,  covering  the  costs  of:  feasibility 
studies for  projects to be  financed  with  the 
new  aid  money;  helping  the  Africans  to 
participate  in  trade  fairs,  and  paying  for 
African training programs. However, during 
this interim period, to new investment prop-
eels could be authorized. 
The Commission said the $6  million could 
be  taken  from  the  Community's  1970  and 
1971  budgets and from a  reserve  fund  pro-
vided by the first  Yaounde Convention. This 
"stop-gap" expenditure would be reimbursed 
from  the  funds  to be  provided  by  the  new 
Convention. 
FRANCE  IS  FIRST  TO 
RATIFY  ARUSHA  AGREEMENT 
France  on  April  14  ratified  the  association 
agreement  between  the  European  Commu-
nity  and  Tanzania,  Uganda,  and  Kenya, 
signed  at  Arusha  on  September  24,  1969. 
France  is  the  first  state  to  do  so. 
Guido Colonna di Paliano 
COLONNA  RESIGNS 
COMMISSION POST 
Guido  Colonna  di  Paliano,  Commission 
member with special responsibility for indus-
trial affairs,  resigned  in  May, to assume the 
presidency of Italy's largest chain of depart-
ment  stores,  La Rinascente. 
Mr.  Colonna  supervised  the  preparation 
of  the  Commission's  recent  memorandum 
on  industrial  policy  (see  European  Com-
munity  No.  133,  page  4).  He  joined  the 
Community in September 1964 as a member 
of  the  European  Economic  Community 
Commission, responsible for internal  market 
affairs.  He  held  this  post  until  July  1967 
when  the  executive  bodies  of  the  EEC,  the 
Coal  and  Steel,  and  Atomic  Energy  Com-
munities  merged  and  he  became  a  member 
in  the  new,  single  European  Communities 
Commission. 
The  vacancy  left  on  the  Commission  by 
Mr. Colonna's resignation  will  not be filled. 
in  view  of the  reduction,  to  nine  members, 
to be made this July. In the interim, Lionello 
Levi  Sandri,  a  Commission  Vice  President. 
will  take over Mr. Colonna's responsibilities. 
MORE  FRUIT  IN  FRUIT 
DRINKS  PROPOSED 
Fruit  drinks  marketed  in  the  European 
Community  should  contain  at  least  10  per 
cent pure fruit juice, according to a  proposal 
made by the Commission on April 15. 
Germany requires a  6  per cent  minimum 
pure fruit juice content; the Netherlands, 10 
percent,  and  Italy,  12  per  cent.  France, 
Luxembourg,  and  Belgium  have  no  legisla-
tion  in  this  area. PREFERENTIAL  ACCORDS ARE  COMPATIBLE  WITH GATT 
The European Community's policy  of asso-
ciation  and preferential  trade  agreements  is 
compatible  with  the General  Agreement on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  the  Commission 
said  in  a  memorandum  submitted  to  the 
Council  of  Ministers  on  April  16. 
The memorandum was an attempt to clarify 
the Community's policy in  this area and thus 
allay  fears  expressed  by  the  United  States 
and  other  industrialized  countries  that  the 
"proliferation"  of  these  agreements  could 
jeopardize  the  GATI's  most-favored-nation 
clause.  According  to this  clause,  each  GATT 
member  agrees  to  extend  all  other  GATT 
members the most favorable tariff treatment 
granted  to  any  one of them. 
"Preferential"  Trade  Negligible 
fn  general,  the  Commission  confirmed  that 
the  Community  intends  to  abide  by  GATT 
provisions.  It  now  does  90  per  cent  of  its 
trade  in  full  observance  of  general  GATT 
rules.  The  Commission  also  said  that  the 
Community  intends  to  limit  its  preferential 
policy  to  agreements  with: 
•  European  countries  that  cannot  become 
members of the Community (such as neutral 
Austria) 
•  developing  African  countries  (already 
associated,  or  which  wish  to  become  asso-
ciated  with the Community) 
•  countries  on  the  Mediterranean  basin, 
with economies similar to countries that had 
"special  links"  with  one  of  the  Six  before 
the  Common  Market  Treaty  was  signed 
(such  as  Algeria,  Morocco,  Tunisia,  and 
Libya).  The  Commission  said  it  would  be 
politically  and  economically  impossible  for 
the  Community  to  refuse  other  Mediterra-
nean countries the  treatment granted  to  the 
countries  covered by  the  protocols annexed 
to  the  Rome  Treaty.  In  practice,  only  the 
United  Arab  Republic.  Israel,  and  Lebanon 
are affected. 
Previous Links Recognized 
The Community's preferential policy merely 
recognizes  and puts into a  Community con-
text the special links that individual member 
countries  had  when  the  Common  Market 
Treaty was  signed.  A  refusal  to  grant  pref-
erential  agreements to  these  other countries 
would  constitute  discrimination,  the  Com-
mission  said.  It  also  stressed  that  none  of 
these agreements had prejudiced the Commu-
nity's  trading relations  with other countries. 
Computers keep track of shipments at  the new Rungis food market.  PHOTO: Courtesy Com-
pagnie Bull General Electric, Paris. 
EIB'S  LOAN  TO  NEW PARIS  FOOD  MARKET 
The European Investment Bank in April lent 
$15  million  to  Semmaris,  a  semi-public 
French  company  in  charge  of  Paris'  new 
food  market  at  Rungis,  near  Orly  airport. 
This  market  replaces  Les  Hailes  the  old 
food  market  in  the  congested  center of the 
city. 
The  loan  will  help  the  company  finance 
a  $57-million plan to create an international 
trade  center  at  Rungis.  Although  the  Bank 
rarely  helps  developed  parts  of  the  Com-
munity,  such  as  the  Paris  region,  and  has 
not  financed  any  trade  projects,  it  decided 
to  make  the  loan  in  the  belief  that  the 
project will  help to modernize the marketing 
of  produce,  thus  indirectly  aiding  French 
farmers  and  stimulate  Community  trade  in 
farm  products. 
The  loan  will  help  pay  for  marketing 
halls,  offices,  electronic  equipment  for 
collecting,  processing,  and  transmitting  in-
formation  internationally. 
EUROPEAN  PATENTS 
CONFERENCE  ADJOURNS 
The Inter-Governmental Conference for  the 
creation of a  European system for  granting 
patents will  hold  its  fourth  meeting in  Lux-
embourg on April 21-30, 1971. 
Its last  meeting, April 21-22,  was devoted 
to hearing the views of non-governmental in-
ternational  organizations  about  the  main 
problems connected with the proposed Euro-
pean  patent  system.  Before  adjourning,  the 
Conference agreed that a  second such meet-
ing should be arranged. 
The following non-governmental organiza-
tions participated in  the last meeting:  the In-
ternational  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Paris; 
the Committee of National Institutes of Pat-
ent Agents, Eindhoven, the  Netherlands; the 
Council of European Industrial Federations, 
Paris; the European Industrial Research Man-
agement Association, Paris; the International 
Federation  of  Councils  on  Industrial  Prop-
erty,  Paris; the  International Association for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, Zurich; 
the International Federation of Inventors As-
sociations,  London,  the  Union of Industries 
in  the  European  Community,  Brussels,  and 
the Union of European  Patent Agents,  Dus-
seldorf. 
FREE  ESTABLISHMENT  FOR 
SELF-EMPLOYED  TRANSPORT 
Three draft directives on freedom  of estab-
lishment for self-employed activities  in  road 
haulage,  passenger  transport  by  road,  and 
goods  and  passenger  transport  by  inland 
waterway  have  been  sent  to  the  European 
Communities  Council  of  Ministers. 
Adopted by the Commission on March 20, 
the  proposals are  intended  to  eliminate  na-
tionality  as  a  basis  of  discrimination  by 
providing for mutual recognition of creden-
tials concerning good character and integrity, 
financial  standing,  and  professional  com-
petence. 
The Council of Ministers, at its  April 21-
22  meeting,  agreed  to  consult the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee about  these  draft  directives. 
EIB  LOAN  FOR  ITALIAN 
HIGHWAY  EXTENSION 
The  European  Investment  Bank  has  made 
a  $15-million  loan  for  the  construction  of 
another 28 mile section of the Italian Riviera 
motorway.  Total  cost  of  completing  this 
section is  estimated at $163  million. In  1968 
the  Bank  made  a  $16-million  loan  for  a 
section  linking  the  Franco-Italian  border 
with  San  Remo.  21 22 
MAY  IS  THE  STORK'S  BUSIEST  MONTH 
May is  the  stork's  busiest month in  the Six, 
say  the  Community's  statisticians. 
In  May  1968  there  were  273,908  births 
compared  with  a  monthly  average  of 
258,900.  August  was  the  most  popular 
month  for  marriages  in  the  Community: 
163,409,  as  against  a  monthly  average  of 
113,900. 
MARRIAGES  AND  BffiTHS  IN THE  COMMUNITY  (1968) 
Monthly  Average 
Country  Marriages  Births 
Germany  37,000  80,700 
France  29,800  69,500 
Italy  31,300  77,600 
Netherlands  9,800  19,800 
Belgium  5,800  11,900 
Luxembourg  200  400 
Community  113,900  258,900 
EUROPEAN  UNIVERSITY 
IDEA  REVIVED  AGAIN 
The  idea  of creating  a  European university 
was  again  revived  on  April  9  when  the 
European Communities Commission released 
a  memorandum  on  this  subject  to  the 
Council  of  Ministers. 
In  the  memorandum,  the  Commission 
suggested  that  the  Council  devote  one  of 
its  meetings  to  discussion  of  the  gradual 
creation  of:  European  university  teaching 
establishments;  a  European  higher  educa-
tion  committee  which  could  confer  the 
title  of  "European"  institute  on  qualified 
academic  bodies,  and  machinery  to  harmo-
nize  teaching programs and promote mutual 
recognition of degrees  and diplomas. 
At  The  Hague  summit  last  December, 
the  Six  "reaffirmed  their  interest  in  the 
establishment  of  a  European  university." 
The Italian Government acquired  a  site for 
the  university  in  Florence  some  time  ago, 
after the idea was first  raised.  However, the 
plan has made little headway, partly because 
educators  themselves  are  divided  over  its 
merits. 
TEXTILE  TAX  DISPUTE 
France  has  challenged,  in  the  Community 
Court of Justice,  the Commission's  decision 
of July  1968  that a  French tax of 0.20  per 
cent on textile sales was an infringement of 
the Rome Treaty ban on state aids. Proceeds 
from  the  tax  have  been  used  to  modernize 
the French textile industry. 
France  says  the  Treaty  empowers  the 
Commission  to  call for  abolition or modifi-
cation  of state  aids  but  not  to  contest  the 
way  an  aid  is  financed.  The  Commission 
claims that the aid and the way  it  is  financed 
are  interdependent  and  that  the  aid  is  dis-
torting  competition. 
Most  Popular Month 
Marriages  Births 
Aug.:  64,365  May: 
July:  45,300  May: 
Sept.:  56,713  Jan.: 
Dec.:  23,018  May: 
July:  11,886  May: 
May:  323  May: 
Aug.:  163,409  May: 
ALGERIA  SEEKS  TRADE 








Algeria's  Foreign  Trade  Minister  Layashi 
Yaker  visited  Brussels  in  March  to discuss 
the possibilities of negotiating a  comprehen-
sive  trade  agreement  with  the  Community. 
Partial  association  agreements  between 
the  Community and Algeria's two  Maghreb 
neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, were signed 
last year. The Six have also agreed,  in prin-
ciple,  to  a  preferential  trade  pact  with  the 
United  Arab  Republic. 
CONCESSIONS  FOR  IMPORTS 
OF  "SENSITIVE"  AFRICAN 
FARM  PRODUCTS 
The Six  have worked  out an  improved  im-
port  system  for  agricultural  products  from 
the  17  Mrican associated  states and  Mada-
gascar  which  are  identical  or  competitive 
with  Community farm  products. 
Under  the  second  Yaounde  Convention, 
associating  the  Eighteen  with  the  Com-
munity,  these  "sensitive"  products  were  ex-
cluded  from  the  free-entry  arrangements 
negotiated  for  other  products  (as  was  the 
case under the first  Convention). The Com-
munity  did,  however,  pledge  to  grant  these 
products  more  favorable  treatment  than 
that accorded  products  imported from  else-
where. 
The  new  system  was  brought  imo  effect 
on  April  1  (for rice  the  date  is  June)  al-
though  the  Convention  has  not  yet  been 
ratified by all signatories. The main products 
involved  are  rice,  and  processed  products 
with  bases  of fruit,  vegetables,  and  various 
grains.  Sugar  has  been  excluded  fwm  the 
concession,  but  the  Commission  has  pro-
posed duty free  entry for tobacco wher.  the 
Convention  comes  into  force. 
LEVI  SANDRI  HAILS  LABOR 
SUPPORT  OF  EUROPE 
Lionello  Levi  Sandri,  in  a  message  on 
Europe's "Labor Day," May 1,  called upon 
labor  unions  in  the  European  Community 
to  continue  their  strong  support  for  the 
unification  of Europe. 
Mr.  Levi  Sandri,  a  vice  president of the 
Commission  with  special  responsibility  for 
labor  and  social  affairs,  said  that  only  if 
workers and the political and labor organi-
zations  representing  them  steadily  pursue 
the  construction  of a  united  Europe  will  it 
be  possible  to  create  the  new  and  modern 
society  that  Europeans  want. 
A  EUROPEAN  DRIVER'S 
LICENSE  TO  IMPROVE 
HIGHWAY  SAFETY 
To stop the rapid  decline of highway  safety 
in  the  European Community, The Commis-
sion  plans to propose harmonization of the 
requirements  for  driver's  licenses,  which 
now vary widely. The most stringent existing 
national  requirements  would  be  made  the 
Community standard. Mutual recognition  <Jf 
permits  issued  by  other  members  would  be 
the  final  objective. 
The Commission made this announcement 
on April  14  in answering a  written question 
from Pierre-Bernard Couste, French Gaullist 
member of the European Parliament.  High-
way  fatalities had reached epidemic  propor-
tions in Europe, Mr. Couste pointed out. In 
France alone, he said,  they were responsible 
for  half  of  all  male  deaths  in  the  15-20 
year-old  age  group. 
The  Commission  also  stressed  the  value 
of  driver  training,  pointing  out  that  the 
Community's  regulations  on road  transport 
set a minimum age for truck and bus drivers 
and  provide  for  minimum  training  require-
ments.  The  specific  minimum  training  re-
quirements  are  now  being  worked  out,  the 
Commission  said. 
ITALY  LOWERS  IMPORT 
TAX  RATES  UNDER  TVA 
Italy  has  informed  the  European  Commu-
nities  Commission  that  it  has  reduced  the 
maximum rates of export refunds and import 
taxes  levied  as  part of that  country's  turn-
over  tax  system. 
Italy  pledged  to  reduce  these  rates  last 
December  when  the  Council  of  Ministers 
authorized  postponement  until  January  1, 
1972,  of  the  introduction  of  the  Commu-
nity's common turnover tax  system,  the tax 
on the  value  added  (TVA)  at  each  stage  of 
production and distribution  up  to  the  retail 
level.  The  original  compliance  date  was  to 
have  been  January  1,  1970. FRANCE  DROPS  SPECIAL 
RATE  FOR  EXPORT  LOANS 
France  in  April  abolished  the  practice  of 
lending  exporters  money  at  a  preferential 
rate,  following  a  Community Court of Jus-
tice  ruling  in  December  1969. 
The Court had upheld a Commission plea 
that  the reduced  rate constituted  an  export 
aid and was therefore contrary to the Rome 
Treaty.  It turned  down  the  French  claim 
that  the  Co=ission's  action  infringed 
French  national  sovereignty  in  monetary 
matters. The Court recognized that member 
states  retained  responsibility  for  ensuring 
the  stability  of  their  balance  of payments, 
but  said  that  the  Community  institutions' 
powers  of  authorization  and  intervention 
would  be  pointless  if  member  states  could 
unilaterally  ignore  provisions  of  the  Rome 
Treaty. 
TALKS  START  WITH  MALT  A 
A  first  round of negotiations between  Malta 
and  the  European  Community  was  held  in 
Brussels on April 7,  1970.  They will  be  re-
sumed  on  June  2.  Malta,  an  independent 
sovereign state with a population of 330,000, 
is  an  island  in  the  Mediterranean  between 
Sicily and Africa with traditional  trade links 
with  Britain. 
The  Maltese  Government applied  for  the 
opening of negotiations with the Community 
on September 4,  1967. Talks on this applica-
tion were held between the Commission and 
the  Maltese  Delegation  on  October  21-23, 
1969.  On  the  basis  of  a  report  from  the 
Commission,  the  Council  decided  on  the 
opening  of  negotiations  at  its  meeting  on 
March  6,  1970. 
WORKERS'  PARTICIPATION 
SOUGHT IN EUROPEAN 
FIRMS 
Legal provision for workers' participation in 
the management of future  "European" com-
panies was formally  demanded on April  14, 
when  a delegation of the European Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions called on the 
European Communities Commission. 
For some years, the Commission has been 
trying to promote a European company stat-
ute  which  would  enable  Community  firms 
wanting  to  merge  across  frontiers  to  over-
come  existing  tax  and  administrative  ob-
stacles. The Confederation, which represents 
12  million workers in the six  member coun-
tries,  proposed the safeguarding of workers' 
interests  by  alloting  one  third  of the  com-
panies'  board  seats  to  union  representatives 
and providing for a supervisory council, half 
of whose members would be union represen-
tatives. 
AUTOMATIC COUPLERS  FOR 
EUROPEAN  RAILROADS? 
Automatic  couplers  on  railroad  cars would 
improve  on-the-job  safety  of  rail  workers, 
reduce  operating  costs,  and  expedite  the 
flow  of  rail  traffic  within  the  European 
Community  and  between  the  Community 
and other European countries. 
For  these  reasons,  the  Commission  on 
April  20  invited  the  Council  of  Ministers 
to  make  a  decision  about  the  eventual  use 
i>f  automatic couplers on their rolling  stock 
and  about  undertaking  joint  studies  of the 
costs,  financing,  and  other  aspects  of  the 
question. November 30,  1970, was suggested 
as  the  target  date  for  completing  these 
studies. 
"PATE  DE  FOIE"  IS 
NOT "LEBERPASTETE" 
French pate de foie is not necessarily  /eber-
pastete  in  Germany,  the  Commission  has 
ruled.  It  said  that  because  of varying  Ger-
man and French quality standards for  meat 
products, the German authorities are entitled 
to prohibit  French  Iiverpaste  manufacturers 
from  labeling  their  exports  to  Germany 
leberpastete if they do  not  conform  to  Ger-
man standards. This distortion of trade will 
only  be  eliminated  when  harmonized  Com-
munity  standards  are  introduced,  according 
to  the  Commission. 
FOOD AID GIVEN TO 
TURKEY  AFTER  EARTHQUAKE 
The European Community will  give  Turkey 
10,000 metric tons of rye and 10,000 tons of 
wheat as  emergency food  aid, following  the 
earthquake on March 28-29. 
The agreement  was  signed  in  Brussels  on 
May 6.  The gift will  be made froin the Com-
munity's 1969/70 and 1970!71 food aid pro-
grams. 
At a  meeting of the Council of Ministers 
in  Luxembourg  on  April  21-22,  it  was  de-
cided to supply India with 1,100 tons of skim 
milk under the Community's agreement with 
the  International Red  Cross. 
BARRE:  FIXED  EXCHANGE 
RATES  ARE  NECESSARY 
Raymond  Barre,  Commission  Vice  Presi-
dent of the  European Communities,  said  in 
London  on  April  7  that  Britain  and  other 
applicants  for  Community  membership 
would  have  to  accept  fixed  exchange  rates 
as  part  of  the  Community's  program  for 
achieving  economic  and  monetary  union. 
Mr.  Barre  also  said  the  enlargement  of 
the  Community  should  be  achieved  regard-
less  of the  price. 
RECENT  BOOKS ON 
COMMUNITY TOPICS 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  periodically  lists 
books dealing with Community and Atlantic 
topics.  This  presentation  does  not  indicate 
approval or recommendation of these  publi-
cations. 
The International Corporation: With an Epi-
logue  on  "Rights  and  Responsibilities'',  By 
Sidney E. Rolfe.  The International Chamber 
of Commerce, Paris,  1969,  202 pages includ-
ing statistical annexes. 
A background report on the internationaliza-
tion of production, prepared for the XXIInd 
Congress  of  the  International  Chamber  of 
Commerce, in Istanbul, May 31-June 7, 1969. 
The  author  points  out  that  the  interna-
tionalization  of  production  by  large  inter-
national corporations is  not a new phenome-
non.  Contrary to popular belief,  it  is  not  a 
purely "American Challenge" but rather an 
international  one:  in  1966  assets  of  other 
countries  in  foreign  countries  amounted  to 
$35  billion, as compared with similar Amer-
ican holdings  of $55  billion. 
Profitable  operation  is  the  motive  of the 
international  corporation,  but  a  by-product 
of its operations is  to further economic inte-
gration  by  extending  the  factors  of produc-
tion  across national borders. In the process, 
it has not killed small and local business. The 
internationalization  of  production  is  likely 
to increase in  coming years,  the  author con-
cludes. 
Beyond the European Community. By  Franz 
A.  M.  Alting von Geusau. The John F. Ken-
nedy Institute, Center for International Stud-
ies.  A.  W.  Sijthoff, Leyden, the Netherlands, 
1969, 247 pages with index. 
An examination of the reasons for the Euro-
pean Communities' crises of the Sixties. 
The author believes these crises originated 
in  traditional and legalistic  federal  thinking. 
He evaluates the Communities' performances 
as  supranational  organizations,  as  trading 
partners of other European countries, mem-
bers  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade,  and  as  a  nucleus  for  political 
union and common defense. The author con-
cludes with suggestions for reappraising Eu-
ropean integration in the Seventies. 
The  International  Market  for  Foreign  Ex-
change.  Edited  by  Robert  Z.  Aliber.  Fred-
erick  A.  Praeger,  New  York,  Washington, 
London, 1969, 272 pages. 
This  volume,  published  in  cooperation  with 
the University of Chicago's Graduate School 
of Business, is  based on a conference held in 
March 1967  at Ditcbley Park, England. The  23 conference brought together members of the 
academic  community  interested  in  foreign 
exchange  transactions  and  members  of  the 
banking community  with  operational  rather 
than analytical skills. 
Some of the unique aspects of foreign ex-
change  transactions  are  examined,  particu-
larly  the  explicit  and  implicit costs  encoun-
tered  in  this  field  of international  business, 
and the best means of organizing and super-
vising foreign exchange markets. 
International Policy for tbe World Economy. 
By  J.  0. N.  Perkins.  Frederick A.  Praeger, 
New  York,  Washington,  1969,  232  pages 
with index. 
An examination of needed  reforms in inter-
national monetary arrangements as indicated 
by recent crises. 
The author emphasizes the importance of 
international  monetary  reforms  within  the 
context of other main  areas of international 
economic  cooperation.  He examines  the  in-
teraction of domestic programs for achieving 
full employment and  their effects on the bal-
ance  of payments,  the  effects  of  efforts  to 
promote  trade  by  reducing  obstacles,  and 
policy toward capital flows and economic aid. 
Tbe  Prop• > al  for  a  European  Company. 
By  Dennb  Thompson.  Chatham  House/ 
Political  a•1u ·Economic  Planning,  London, 
1970,  1'3  p  ge. 
History. of the draft statute for a  European 
compaqy law. 
The  author  explains  why  national  laws 
have  prevented  companies  in  the  European 
Community  from  growing  large  enough  to 
take  full  advantage  of  their  countries'  in-
creasing  economic  interdependence. 
Reserve  Now for Fall 
The  European  Community  Information  Sen·ice  will  lend  schools,  libraries,  ci1·ic  associa-
lions, and o!her in/crested organizmions !llis  eYhibir on  1/11'  Coll/1/lllnity,  free  of charge;  but 
resen •ations  should  be  made  early.  Pane/.1 ·  show  dij/crenl  aspects  of  Community  affairs: 
external  relations,  trade,  nuclear  energv.  and  the  Conununity's  associarion  wirh  Africa. 
Standinf:,  the display mea.1ures 28  inches  deep  h 1·  711  inches  ll'ide.  It  is  7 Jeer  4  inches  high, 
including the  headboard and  /igllfs.  Panels,  ligh1. 1,  allll  fmme  fit  into a  II'Uoden  crate espe-
cially built for safe shipment. 
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